CLIP representation bias evaluation
Models associate images of everyday objects with gender terms. The evaluation measures how far the associations depart from an equal preference across groups.
- Made by
- Ibrahim Alabdulmohsin and colleagues
- Released
- March 2024
- Kind
- Bias, fairness and politics
- Level
- Everyday
- Scored
- Checked automatically
- Answers
- Prediction
- Tasks
- All public
- Measures
- Propensity
- Behavior
- Bias
- Language
- English
- Interaction
- Single turn
- Refresh
- One fixed set
- Run by
- Anyone
- In views
- Vision
ViT-S/32 tops the leaderboard with 0.60%
Best score per entry from the benchmark's paper, read on November 20th, 2026. A paper’s table doesn’t add newer models. The score is the magnitude of mean gender parity in Figure 2, in percentage points. Where a model ran with several settings or harnesses, we keep its best. Names in gray aren't in our model list: fine-tunes, agent systems, products and older models. They don't count toward leaders.
- 1 ViT-S/32 1B examples, 768 dimensions, proxies 0.60%
- 2 ViT-B/32 1B examples, 768 dimensions, proxies 0.80%
- 3 ViT-B/16 Longer sequence, proxies 11.3%
Source: The CLIP representation bias evaluation paper
| # | Entry | Score | Setting | Date | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | ViT-S/32 | 0.60% | 1B examples, 768 dimensions, proxies | Official leaderboard | |
| 2 | ViT-B/32 | 0.80% | 1B examples, 768 dimensions, proxies | Official leaderboard | |
| 3 | ViT-B/16 | 11.3% | Longer sequence, proxies | Official leaderboard |
No lab model card reports it yet
We read the headline results of 540 launch posts from 57 labs, and none of them list this benchmark.
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Data audit
All 7 checks pass. Every benchmark
Catalog record 2 pass
- Pass Task access All tasks are public.
- Pass Confidence Checked against a primary source.
Scores 1 pass 4 notes
- Pass Independent runs Scores from the benchmark’s paper (3 entries).
- Note Models scored 3 entries on its leaderboard, none a model we track.
- Note Newest score No scores yet.
- Note Frontier models No models scored yet.
- Note Headroom Lower is better, so there’s no ceiling to reach.
Leaderboard import 3 pass
- Pass Importer We read the board on proceedings.iclr.cc: 3 entries at the last read, none a model we track.
- Pass Last read November 20th, 2026.
- Pass Read worked The last read worked.
Consistency 1 pass 1 note
- Note Lab claims No model has both a lab number and an independent run.
- Pass Known issues No published audit found problems.