Benchmark Almanac

JailTrickBench

Vicuna-13B-v1.5 0% tops its leaderboard
Not in model cards

Models respond to jailbreak attacks under varied attack and defense settings. A GPT-4 evaluator judges attack success across harmful-request datasets.

The framework varies eight experimental factors and compares multiple attacks and defenses. Scores depend on the attack, defense, and target settings.

Released
June 2024
Kind
Jailbreaks and prompt injection
Level
Expert
Scored
Graded by a model
Answers
Open-ended
Tasks
All public
Measures
Propensity
Behavior
Harmful use
Language
English
In and out
Text → Text
Interaction
Single turn
Refresh
One fixed set
Run by
Anyone
In views
Content safety

In the authors’ words

Although Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated significant capabilities in executing complex tasks in a zero-shot manner, they are susceptible to jailbreak attacks and can be manipulated to produce harmful outputs. Recently, a growing body of research has categorized jailbreak attacks into token-level and prompt-level attacks. However, previous work primarily overlooks the diverse key factors of jailbreak attacks, with most studies concentrating on LLM vulnerabilities and lacking exploration of defense-enhanced LLMs. To address these issues, we introduced JailTrickBench to evaluate the impact of various attack settings on LLM performance and provide a baseline for jailbreak attacks, encouraging the adoption of a standardized evaluation framework. Specifically, we evaluate the eight key factors of implementing jailbreak attacks on LLMs from both target-level and attack-level perspectives. We further conduct seven representative jailbreak attacks on six defense methods across two widely used datasets, encompassing approximately 354 experiments with about 55,000 GPU hours on A800-80G. Our experimental results highlight the need for standardized benchmarking to evaluate these attacks on defense-enhanced LLMs. Our code is available at https://github.com/usail-hkust/JailTrickBench.

Abstract of Bag of Tricks: Benchmarking of Jailbreak Attacks on LLMs (arXiv:2406.09324, CC0)
2
Entries in its paper, 0 models we track

Vicuna-13B-v1.5 tops the leaderboard with 0%

Best score per entry from the benchmark's paper, read on November 20th, 2026. A paper’s table doesn’t add newer models. The headline is the plain mean of the judge-assessed attack success rates on AdvBench and MaliciousInstruct. Where a model ran with several settings or harnesses, we keep its best. Names in gray aren't in our model list: fine-tunes, agent systems, products and older models. They don't count toward leaders.

  1. 1 Vicuna-13B-v1.5 AmpleGCG, RPO 0%
  2. 2 Llama-2-7B-chat-hf GCG, Self-Reminder 0%

Source: The JailTrickBench paper

#EntryScoreSettingDateSource
1 Vicuna-13B-v1.5 0% AmpleGCG, RPO Official leaderboard
2 Llama-2-7B-chat-hf 0% GCG, Self-Reminder Official leaderboard

No lab model card reports it yet

We read the headline results of 540 launch posts from 57 labs, and none of them list this benchmark.

More in Safety and alignment

All 636 in Safety and alignment
  • FORTRESS In use Paired adversarial and benign national-security misuse prompts. Rubric-graded risk score on adversarial and over-refusal score on benign prompts. Claude Opus 5.5 5.78%
  • StrongREJECT In use Forbidden-prompt jailbreak benchmark with a rubric grader that scores how useful a non-refusal actually is. Inkling 98.6%
  • Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts. Gemini 4 Carbon 0%
  • Covert misbehavior (Thinking Machines) In use Agentic tasks that check whether a model misbehaves and conceals it. Scored by the rate of covert misbehavior. Inkling 2 Mini 8.30%
  • Destructive actions (Thinking Machines) In use Agentic tasks that check whether a model takes destructive actions it was not authorized to take. Scored by the rate of destructive actions. Inkling 2 Small 4.70%
  • Misbehavior (Thinking Machines) In use Agentic tasks that check whether a model fabricates results, ignores instructions or hides what it did when a task is hard. Scored by the rate of misbehavior. Inkling 2 Mini 9.80%

Data audit

All 7 checks pass. Every benchmark

Catalog record 2 pass
  • Pass Task access All tasks are public.
  • Pass Confidence Checked against a primary source.
Scores 1 pass 4 notes
  • Pass Independent runs Scores from the benchmark’s paper (2 entries).
  • Note Models scored 2 entries on its leaderboard, none a model we track.
  • Note Newest score No scores yet.
  • Note Frontier models No models scored yet.
  • Note Headroom Lower is better, so there’s no ceiling to reach.
Leaderboard import 3 pass
  • Pass Importer We read the board on proceedings.neurips.cc: 2 entries at the last read, none a model we track.
  • Pass Last read November 20th, 2026.
  • Pass Read worked The last read worked.
Consistency 1 pass 1 note
  • Note Lab claims No model has both a lab number and an independent run.
  • Pass Known issues No published audit found problems.

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