Benchmark Almanac

ToLD-Br

BR-BERT 76% tops its leaderboard
Not in model cards

Models identify toxic language in Brazilian Portuguese posts using human annotations.

MTEB scores the task using accuracy.

Released
October 2020
Kind
Bias, fairness and politics
Level
Everyday
Scored
Checked automatically
Answers
Prediction
Tasks
All public
Measures
Capability
Risk
Hate
Language
Portuguese
In and out
Text → Text
Interaction
Single turn
Items from
Real work and use
Refresh
One fixed set
Run by
Anyone
In views
Content safety
5
Entries in its paper, 0 models we track

BR-BERT tops the leaderboard with 76%

Best score per entry from the benchmark's paper, read on November 20th, 2026. A paper’s table doesn’t add newer models. Where a model ran with several settings or harnesses, we keep its best. Names in gray aren't in our model list: fine-tunes, agent systems, products and older models. They don't count toward leaders.

  1. 1 BR-BERT 76%
  2. 2 M-BERT(transfer) 76%
  3. 3 M-BERT-BR 75%
  4. 4 BoW + AutoML 74%
  5. 5 M-BERT(zero-shot) 56%

Source: The ToLD-Br paper

#EntryScoreSettingDateSource
1 BR-BERT 76% Official leaderboard
2 M-BERT(transfer) 76% Official leaderboard
3 M-BERT-BR 75% Official leaderboard
4 BoW + AutoML 74% Official leaderboard
5 M-BERT(zero-shot) 56% Official leaderboard

No lab model card reports it yet

We read the headline results of 540 launch posts from 57 labs, and none of them list this benchmark.

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Data audit

All 8 checks pass. Every benchmark

Catalog record 2 pass
  • Pass Task access All tasks are public.
  • Pass Confidence Checked against a primary source.
Scores 2 pass 3 notes
  • Pass Independent runs Scores from the benchmark’s paper (5 entries).
  • Pass Models scored 5 entries on its leaderboard, none a model we track.
  • Note Newest score No scores yet.
  • Note Frontier models No models scored yet.
  • Note Headroom No scores yet.
Leaderboard import 3 pass
  • Pass Importer We read the board on arxiv.org: 5 entries at the last read, none a model we track.
  • Pass Last read November 20th, 2026.
  • Pass Read worked The last read worked.
Consistency 1 pass 1 note
  • Note Lab claims No model has both a lab number and an independent run.
  • Pass Known issues No published audit found problems.

How we check