AutoElicit
An optimizer perturbs benign instructions to elicit unsafe behavior from computer-use agents. Reports elicitation success rate on transferred prompts.
Surfaces long-tail safety risks of computer-use agents under realistic inputs.
- Made by
- OSU NLP Group (Jones et al.)
- Released
- February 2026
- Kind
- Refusing harmful requests
- Level
- Expert
- Scored
- Graded by a model
- Answers
- Agent task
- Tasks
- All public
- Strongest model tested
-
Muse Spark 1.3 #26 on the capability index
- Last in a system card
- October 2026
- Last model added
- October 2026
- Scores refreshed
- November 12th, 2026
In the authors’ words
Although computer-use agents (CUAs) hold significant potential to automate increasingly complex OS workflows, they can demonstrate unsafe unintended behaviors that deviate from expected outcomes even under benign input contexts. However, exploration of this risk remains largely anecdotal, lacking concrete characterization and automated methods to proactively surface long-tail unintended behaviors under realistic CUA scenarios. To fill this gap, we introduce the first conceptual and methodological framework for unintended CUA behaviors, by defining their key characteristics, automatically eliciting them, and analyzing how they arise from benign inputs. We propose AutoElicit: an agentic framework that iteratively perturbs benign instructions using CUA execution feedback, and elicits severe harms while keeping perturbations realistic and benign. Using AutoElicit, we surface hundreds of harmful unintended behaviors from state-of-the-art CUAs such as Claude 4.5 Haiku, Claude 4.5 Opus, and Operator. We further evaluate the transferability of human-verified successful perturbations, identifying persistent susceptibility to unintended behaviors across various other frontier CUAs. This work establishes a foundation for systematically analyzing unintended behaviors in realistic computer-use settings.
Muse Spark 1.3 leads with 14.5%
Best score per model as labs report them in their own cards. Labs pick their own settings, so these compare less cleanly than independent runs.
EvoCUA-8B leads with 37.6% across all independent runs
Best score per model across the official leaderboard, Epoch AI’s own runs and any board Epoch AI copied. Each bar and row names its source.
Muse Spark 1.3 leads with 14.5%, claims included
Best score per model from every source, including labs’ own numbers and claims Epoch AI collected from reports and papers. Labs pick their own settings, so a claim can beat an independent run of the same model.
- 1
Muse Spark 1.3 14.5%
Source: Labs’ model cards
- 1
EvoCUA-8B 3 runs 37.6%
- 2 OpenCUA-32B 3 runs 43.6%
- 3 OpenCUA-7B 3 runs 47%
- 4 OpenAI Computer-Using Agent (CUA) 3 runs 48.7%
Source: Official AutoElicit leaderboard
- 1
Muse Spark 1.3 14.5%
- 2
EvoCUA-8B 3 runs 37.6%
- 3 OpenCUA-32B 3 runs 43.6%
- 4 OpenCUA-7B 3 runs 47%
- 5 OpenAI Computer-Using Agent (CUA) 3 runs 48.7%
Sources: Labs’ model cards and official AutoElicit leaderboard
| # | Model | Score | Setting | Date | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | | 14.5% | Oct 2026 | Lab model card |
| # | Model | Score | Setting | Date | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | | 37.6% | 3 runs, AutoElicit | Jan 2026 | Official leaderboard |
| 2 | OpenCUA-32B | 43.6% | 3 runs, AutoElicit | Jul 2025 | Official leaderboard |
| 3 | OpenCUA-7B | 47% | 3 runs, AutoElicit | Jul 2025 | Official leaderboard |
| 4 | OpenAI Computer-Using Agent (CUA) | 48.7% | 3 runs, AutoElicit | Jan 2025 | Official leaderboard |
| # | Model | Score | Setting | Date | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | | 14.5% | Oct 2026 | Lab model card | |
| 2 | | 37.6% | 3 runs, AutoElicit | Jan 2026 | Official leaderboard |
| 3 | OpenCUA-32B | 43.6% | 3 runs, AutoElicit | Jul 2025 | Official leaderboard |
| 4 | OpenCUA-7B | 47% | 3 runs, AutoElicit | Jul 2025 | Official leaderboard |
| 5 | OpenAI Computer-Using Agent (CUA) | 48.7% | 3 runs, AutoElicit | Jan 2025 | Official leaderboard |
The benchmark's own leaderboard has 7 entries, 4 of them models we track. Switch the scores above to rank them together.
Number one over time Number one over time 2 models have held number one with claims included since its release in February 2026
Lab claims count from the day the card came out, independent runs from the model’s release.
Source: Official AutoElicit leaderboard
Scores over time
All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.
Sources: Official AutoElicit leaderboard and labs’ model cards
Labs report it only in system cards
We read the headline results of 522 launch posts from 52 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.
One system card reports it
Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.
| Date | Document | Score | As the document writes it | Section |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oct 23, 2026 | | 14.5 | AutoElicit elicitation success rate on transferred prompts, Muse Spark 1.3 (API) (Figure 39) | Safety |
More in Safety and alignment
- FORTRESS In use Paired adversarial and benign national-security misuse prompts. Rubric-graded risk score on adversarial and over-refusal score on benign prompts. Claude Opus 5.5 5.78%
- StrongREJECT In use Forbidden-prompt jailbreak benchmark with a rubric grader that scores how useful a non-refusal actually is.
Inkling 98.6%
- Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts.
Gemini 4 Carbon 0%
- DistressBench In use Models reply as a chatbot to 718 simulated users in psychological crisis, in single-turn and multi-turn chats. Three judge models score replies against clinician-written rubrics.
Muse Spark 1.2 88.4%
- Lakera B3 (Backbone Breaker Benchmark) In use Crowdsourced prompt-injection attacks hit backbone LLMs inside agent threat snapshots at three defense levels. The score is attack resistance, 100 minus the board's vulnerability percentage. Claude Opus 4.5 89%
- IHEval In use Models face conflicts between system, user and tool instructions. Reports a composite score for following the higher-priority instruction. GPT-4o 70%