Benchmark Almanac

AutoElicit

EvoCUA-8B 37.6% leads since February 2026
Muse Spark 1.3 14.5% leads since October 2026
Only in system cards

An optimizer perturbs benign instructions to elicit unsafe behavior from computer-use agents. Reports elicitation success rate on transferred prompts.

Surfaces long-tail safety risks of computer-use agents under realistic inputs.

Released
February 2026
Kind
Refusing harmful requests
Level
Expert
Scored
Graded by a model
Answers
Agent task
Tasks
All public
Strongest model tested
Muse Spark 1.3 #26 on the capability index
Last in a system card
October 2026
Last model added
October 2026
Scores refreshed
November 12th, 2026

In the authors’ words

Although computer-use agents (CUAs) hold significant potential to automate increasingly complex OS workflows, they can demonstrate unsafe unintended behaviors that deviate from expected outcomes even under benign input contexts. However, exploration of this risk remains largely anecdotal, lacking concrete characterization and automated methods to proactively surface long-tail unintended behaviors under realistic CUA scenarios. To fill this gap, we introduce the first conceptual and methodological framework for unintended CUA behaviors, by defining their key characteristics, automatically eliciting them, and analyzing how they arise from benign inputs. We propose AutoElicit: an agentic framework that iteratively perturbs benign instructions using CUA execution feedback, and elicits severe harms while keeping perturbations realistic and benign. Using AutoElicit, we surface hundreds of harmful unintended behaviors from state-of-the-art CUAs such as Claude 4.5 Haiku, Claude 4.5 Opus, and Operator. We further evaluate the transferability of human-verified successful perturbations, identifying persistent susceptibility to unintended behaviors across various other frontier CUAs. This work establishes a foundation for systematically analyzing unintended behaviors in realistic computer-use settings.

Abstract of When Benign Inputs Lead to Severe Harms: Eliciting Unsafe Unintended Behaviors of Computer-Use Agents (arXiv:2602.08235, CC0)
1
Model scored in lab cards
1
System card reports it, from 1 lab

Muse Spark 1.3 leads with 14.5%

Best score per model as labs report them in their own cards. Labs pick their own settings, so these compare less cleanly than independent runs.

EvoCUA-8B leads with 37.6% across all independent runs

Best score per model across the official leaderboard, Epoch AI’s own runs and any board Epoch AI copied. Each bar and row names its source.

Muse Spark 1.3 leads with 14.5%, claims included

Best score per model from every source, including labs’ own numbers and claims Epoch AI collected from reports and papers. Labs pick their own settings, so a claim can beat an independent run of the same model.

  1. 1 Muse Spark 1.3 14.5%

Source: Labs’ model cards

Source: Official AutoElicit leaderboard

Sources: Labs’ model cards and official AutoElicit leaderboard

#ModelScoreSettingDateSource
1 Muse Spark 1.3 14.5% Oct 2026 Lab model card
#ModelScoreSettingDateSource
1 EvoCUA-8B 37.6% 3 runs, AutoElicit Jan 2026 Official leaderboard
2 OpenCUA-32B 43.6% 3 runs, AutoElicit Jul 2025 Official leaderboard
3 OpenCUA-7B 47% 3 runs, AutoElicit Jul 2025 Official leaderboard
4 OpenAI Computer-Using Agent (CUA) 48.7% 3 runs, AutoElicit Jan 2025 Official leaderboard
#ModelScoreSettingDateSource
1 Muse Spark 1.3 14.5% Oct 2026 Lab model card
2 EvoCUA-8B 37.6% 3 runs, AutoElicit Jan 2026 Official leaderboard
3 OpenCUA-32B 43.6% 3 runs, AutoElicit Jul 2025 Official leaderboard
4 OpenCUA-7B 47% 3 runs, AutoElicit Jul 2025 Official leaderboard
5 OpenAI Computer-Using Agent (CUA) 48.7% 3 runs, AutoElicit Jan 2025 Official leaderboard

The benchmark's own leaderboard has 7 entries, 4 of them models we track. Switch the scores above to rank them together.

Number one over time Number one over time 2 models have held number one with claims included since its release in February 2026

Lab claims count from the day the card came out, independent runs from the model’s release.

Meituan
Own leaderboard Not tested since Feb 2026
EvoCUA-8B 37.6%

Source: Official AutoElicit leaderboard

Scores over time

All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.

On the benchmark’s own leaderboard Reported by the lab in its model card Best so far
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 2025 2026 2027 Muse Spark 1.3 EvoCUA-8B OpenCUA-32B OpenAI Computer-Using Agent (CUA) 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 2025 2026 2027 Muse Spark 1.3 EvoCUA-8B

Sources: Official AutoElicit leaderboard and labs’ model cards

Labs report it only in system cards

We read the headline results of 522 launch posts from 52 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.

One system card reports it

Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.

DateDocumentScoreAs the document writes itSection
Oct 23, 2026 Muse Spark 1.3 system card 14.5 AutoElicit elicitation success rate on transferred prompts, Muse Spark 1.3 (API) (Figure 39) Safety

More in Safety and alignment

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  • Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts. Gemini 4 Carbon 0%
  • DistressBench In use Models reply as a chatbot to 718 simulated users in psychological crisis, in single-turn and multi-turn chats. Three judge models score replies against clinician-written rubrics. Muse Spark 1.2 88.4%
  • Lakera B3 (Backbone Breaker Benchmark) In use Crowdsourced prompt-injection attacks hit backbone LLMs inside agent threat snapshots at three defense levels. The score is attack resistance, 100 minus the board's vulnerability percentage. Claude Opus 4.5 89%
  • IHEval In use Models face conflicts between system, user and tool instructions. Reports a composite score for following the higher-priority instruction. GPT-4o 70%