BrowseSafe-Adapt
Browser agents face adaptive prompt injections across 1,024 tasks. The score is attack success within 64 attempts.
Separate published result set. Scores are not mixed with the other tracks.
- Made by
- Perplexity
- Released
- October 2026
- Kind
- Jailbreaks and prompt injection
- Level
- University
- Scored
- Checked automatically
- Answers
- Agent task
- Tasks
- Public, plus a private test set
- Strongest model tested
- GPT-5.5 #20 on the capability index
- Last model added
- July 2026
- Scores refreshed
- November 12th, 2026
In the authors’ words
Browser agents need to make decisions and execute actions on behalf of users while consuming untrusted webpages, creating opportunities for malicious instructions embedded in webpages to redirect legitimate tasks. We introduce BrowseSafe++, which extends BrowseSafe from 14,719 pages to 38,675 pairs of pages. Most of its prompt injections were observed in the wild on production websites. We keep each injection unchanged and rewrite the sensitive parts of the page around it to protect privacy. Each attacked page has a clean copy of the same page as its control. Both are provided as HTML, Markdown, an accessibility tree, and a screenshot. Every pair includes a user task and its expected answer. The benchmark includes twelve types of websites, from news articles to shared documents and forums, with 24 attack types appearing in 18 different locations on a page. We use these paired pages to train BrowseSafe-Guard, two 0.8B-parameter detectors for text and screenshots. Both achieve higher F1 scores than the detector based on frontier models, while keeping false-positive rates on benign pages and inference cost low. BrowseSafe-Adapt revises benchmark injections from browser-agent feedback, and attacks that succeed on only a few percent of tasks when replayed directly reach up to 95.41% success once adapted.
Claude Sonnet 5 leads with 30.7% among models released by July 2026
Best score per entry from the benchmark's own leaderboard, read on November 12th, 2026. Where a model ran with several settings or harnesses, we keep its best. Names in gray aren't in our model list: fine-tunes, agent systems, products and older models. They don't count toward leaders.
The newest model with a score here came out in July 2026, and nobody has tested a newer one. Among the 20 highest-ranked models on the capability index, these have no score yet:
- Claude Fable 5.2
-
Gemini 4 Carbon
- GPT-6 Astra
- Claude Opus 5.5
- and 15 more
- 1 Claude Sonnet 5 30.7%
- 2 GPT-5.5 65.2%
- 3 Claude Haiku 4.5 78.8%
- 4
Gemini 3.1 Pro 92.9%
- 5
Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite 93.5%
- 6
DeepSeek-V3.1 95%
- 7 Kimi K2 (snapshot unspecified) 95.4%
Source: Official BrowseSafe-Adapt leaderboard
| # | Entry | Score | Setting | Date | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Claude Sonnet 5 | 30.7% | Jun 2026 | Official leaderboard | |
| 2 | GPT-5.5 | 65.2% | Apr 2026 | Official leaderboard | |
| 3 | Claude Haiku 4.5 | 78.8% | Oct 2025 | Official leaderboard | |
| 4 | | 92.9% | Feb 2026 | Official leaderboard | |
| 5 | | 93.5% | Jul 2026 | Official leaderboard | |
| 6 | | 95% | Aug 2025 | Official leaderboard | |
| 7 | Kimi K2 (snapshot unspecified) | 95.4% | Official leaderboard |
Number one over time
Lab claims count from the day the card came out, independent runs from the model’s release.
Source: Official BrowseSafe-Adapt leaderboard
Scores over time
All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.
Source: Official BrowseSafe-Adapt leaderboard
No lab model card reports it yet
We read the headline results of 522 launch posts from 52 labs, and none of them list this benchmark.
More in Safety and alignment
- FORTRESS In use Paired adversarial and benign national-security misuse prompts. Rubric-graded risk score on adversarial and over-refusal score on benign prompts. Claude Opus 5.5 5.78%
- StrongREJECT In use Forbidden-prompt jailbreak benchmark with a rubric grader that scores how useful a non-refusal actually is.
Inkling 98.6%
- Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts.
Gemini 4 Carbon 0%
- DistressBench In use Models reply as a chatbot to 718 simulated users in psychological crisis, in single-turn and multi-turn chats. Three judge models score replies against clinician-written rubrics.
Muse Spark 1.2 88.4%
- Lakera B3 (Backbone Breaker Benchmark) In use Crowdsourced prompt-injection attacks hit backbone LLMs inside agent threat snapshots at three defense levels. The score is attack resistance, 100 minus the board's vulnerability percentage. Claude Opus 4.5 89%
- IHEval In use Models face conflicts between system, user and tool instructions. Reports a composite score for following the higher-priority instruction. GPT-4o 70%