CIMemories
Models use persistent memory across tasks and must withhold attributes when context requires. Reports worst-case disclosure over five samples.
Contextual privacy benchmark. Meta reports violations@5 and completeness.
- Made by
- Meta (Mireshghallah et al.)
- Released
- November 2025
- Kind
- Refusing harmful requests
- Level
- Everyday
- Scored
- Graded by a model
- Answers
- Open-ended
- Tasks
- All public
- Strongest model tested
-
Muse Spark #53 on the capability index
- Last in a launch post
- August 2026
- Last model added
- October 2026
In the authors’ words
Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly use persistent memory from past interactions to enhance personalization and task performance. However, this memory introduces critical risks when sensitive information is revealed in inappropriate contexts. We present CIMemories, a benchmark for evaluating whether LLMs appropriately control information flow from memory based on task context. CIMemories uses synthetic user profiles with over 100 attributes per user, paired with diverse task contexts in which each attribute may be essential for some tasks but inappropriate for others. Our evaluation reveals that frontier models exhibit up to 69% attribute-level violations (leaking information inappropriately), with lower violation rates often coming at the cost of task utility. Violations accumulate across both tasks and runs: as usage increases from 1 to 40 tasks, GPT-5's violations rise from 0.1% to 9.6%, reaching 25.1% when the same prompt is executed 5 times, revealing arbitrary and unstable behavior in which models leak different attributes for identical prompts. Privacy-conscious prompting does not solve this - models overgeneralize, sharing everything or nothing rather than making nuanced, context-dependent decisions. These findings reveal fundamental limitations that require contextually aware reasoning capabilities, not just better prompting or scaling.
Muse Glimmer leads with 26.4%
Best score per model as labs report them in their own cards. Labs pick their own settings, so these compare less cleanly than independent runs.
- 1
Muse Glimmer 26.4%
- 2
Muse Spark 78.3%
Source: Labs’ model cards
| # | Model | Score | Setting | Date | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | | 26.4% | Aug 2026 | Lab model card | |
| 2 | | 78.3% | Jun 2026 | Lab model card |
2 models have held number one in labs’ own numbers since its release in November 2025
Lab claims count from the day the card came out, independent runs from the model’s release.
Source: Labs’ model cards
Scores over time
All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.
Source: Labs’ model cards
One lab put it in a launch post in the last six months
Launch posts from every lab that has listed it, one tick per post. Tall colored ticks include it, and short gray ones leave it out.
| Date | Launch post | Score | As the post writes it |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aug 10, 2026 | 26.4 | CI Memories Violation 26.4 (lower is better), Coverage 64.8 |
2 system cards report it, from 1 lab
Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.
| Date | Document | Score | As the document writes it | Section |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oct 19, 2026 | | 26.4 | CIMemories violation, lower is better, coverage 64.8, high (Tables 2 and 5) | Safety |
| Jun 12, 2026 | | 78.3 | CIMemories violations@5 (Figure 48) | Safety |
More in Safety and alignment
- FORTRESS In use Paired adversarial and benign national-security misuse prompts. Rubric-graded risk score on adversarial and over-refusal score on benign prompts. Claude Opus 5.5 5.78%
- StrongREJECT In use Forbidden-prompt jailbreak benchmark with a rubric grader that scores how useful a non-refusal actually is.
Inkling 98.6%
- Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts.
Gemini 4 Carbon 0%
- DistressBench In use Models reply as a chatbot to 718 simulated users in psychological crisis, in single-turn and multi-turn chats. Three judge models score replies against clinician-written rubrics.
Muse Spark 1.2 88.4%
- Lakera B3 (Backbone Breaker Benchmark) In use Crowdsourced prompt-injection attacks hit backbone LLMs inside agent threat snapshots at three defense levels. The score is attack resistance, 100 minus the board's vulnerability percentage. Claude Opus 4.5 89%
- IHEval In use Models face conflicts between system, user and tool instructions. Reports a composite score for following the higher-priority instruction. GPT-4o 70%