DeceptionBench
Models are asked to help users deceive a third party, in single-turn and multi-turn pressure settings. Reports the share of compliant responses.
Meta reports single-turn and multi-turn deception scores separately.
- Made by
- Huang et al.
- Released
- October 2025
- Kind
- Deception and alignment
- Level
- Everyday
- Scored
- Graded by a model
- Answers
- Open-ended
- Tasks
- All public
- Strongest model tested
-
Muse Spark 1.1 #47 on the capability index
- Last in a system card
- July 2026
- Last model added
- July 2026
In the authors’ words
Despite the remarkable advances of Large Language Models (LLMs) across diverse cognitive tasks, the rapid enhancement of these capabilities also introduces emergent deceptive behaviors that may induce severe risks in high-stakes deployments. More critically, the characterization of deception across realistic real-world scenarios remains underexplored. To bridge this gap, we establish DeceptionBench, the first benchmark that systematically evaluates how deceptive tendencies manifest across different societal domains, what their intrinsic behavioral patterns are, and how extrinsic factors affect them. Specifically, on the static count, the benchmark encompasses 150 meticulously designed scenarios in five domains, i.e., Economy, Healthcare, Education, Social Interaction, and Entertainment, with over 1,000 samples, providing sufficient empirical foundations for deception analysis. On the intrinsic dimension, we explore whether models exhibit self-interested egoistic tendencies or sycophantic behaviors that prioritize user appeasement. On the extrinsic dimension, we investigate how contextual factors modulate deceptive outputs under neutral conditions, reward-based incentivization, and coercive pressures. Moreover, we incorporate sustained multi-turn interaction loops to construct a more realistic simulation of real-world feedback dynamics. Extensive experiments across LLMs and Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) reveal critical vulnerabilities, particularly amplified deception under reinforcement dynamics, demonstrating that current models lack robust resistance to manipulative contextual cues and the urgent need for advanced safeguards against various deception behaviors. Code and resources are publicly available at https://github.com/Aries-iai/DeceptionBench.
Muse Spark 1.1 leads with 0.10%
Best score per model as labs report them in their own cards, drawn striped. Labs pick their own settings, so these compare less cleanly than independent runs.
- 1
Muse Spark 1.1 0.10%
- 2
Muse Spark 1.60%
Source: Labs’ model cards
| # | Model | Score | Setting | Date | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | | 0.10% | Jul 2026 | Lab model card | |
| 2 | | 1.60% | Jun 2026 | Lab model card |
Scores over time
All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.
Source: Labs’ model cards
Labs report it only in system cards
We read the headline results of 523 launch posts from 52 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.
2 system cards report it, from 1 lab
Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.
| Date | Document | Score | As the document writes it | Section |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jul 9, 2026 | | 0.1 | DeceptionBench deception score, single-turn (Table 2, Figure 34). Multi-turn 1.0 | Alignment |
| Jun 12, 2026 | | 1.6 | DeceptionBench deception score (Table 2, Figure 45) | Alignment |
More in Safety and alignment
- FORTRESS In use Paired adversarial and benign national-security misuse prompts. Rubric-graded risk score on adversarial and over-refusal score on benign prompts. Claude Opus 5.5 5.78%
- StrongREJECT In use Forbidden-prompt jailbreak benchmark with a rubric grader that scores how useful a non-refusal actually is.
Inkling 98.6%
- Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts.
Gemini 4 Carbon 0%
- DistressBench In use Models reply as a chatbot to 718 simulated users in psychological crisis, in single-turn and multi-turn chats. Three judge models score replies against clinician-written rubrics.
Muse Spark 1.2 88.4%
- Lakera B3 (Backbone Breaker Benchmark) In use Crowdsourced prompt-injection attacks hit backbone LLMs inside agent threat snapshots at three defense levels. The score is attack resistance, 100 minus the board's vulnerability percentage. Claude Opus 4.5 89%
- IHEval In use Models face conflicts between system, user and tool instructions. Reports a composite score for following the higher-priority instruction. GPT-4o 70%