Discoverable memorization of training data
Models continue 50-token prefixes sampled from their own training data. The test counts exact and approximate copies of the true suffix.
In-house Google method on over 700,000 training documents. Reports usually plot rates on a log scale without printed numbers.
- Made by
- Google DeepMind
- Kind
- Refusing harmful requests
- Level
- Everyday
- Scored
- Checked automatically
- Answers
- Short answer
- Tasks
- Kept private
- Last in a system card
- July 2025
- Last model added
- July 2025
2
System cards report it, from 1 lab
No scores here yet
No lab, leaderboard or Epoch AI run has reported a score for Discoverable memorization of training data yet.
Labs report it only in system cards
We read the headline results of 522 launch posts from 52 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.
2 system cards report it, from 1 lab
Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.
| Date | Document | Score | As the document writes it | Section |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jul 7, 2025 |  Gemini 2.5 Pro technical report | Total memorization rate, exact and approximate, log-scale chart without printed values; no personal information found in memorized outputs (Figure 8, Section 5.6) | Safety | |
| Jul 7, 2025 | Gemini 2.5 Flash technical report | Total memorization rate, exact and approximate, log-scale chart without printed values; no personal information found in memorized outputs (Figure 8, Section 5.6) | Safety |
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