DTap Direct Misuse
An attacker agent generates adaptive jailbreaks against a target agent across tool-use and browser-use tasks. Reports attack success rate.
Direct-misuse subset of the DecodingTrust-Agent Platform. 80 tool-use and 76 browser-use tasks.
- Released
- May 2026
- Kind
- Refusing harmful requests
- Level
- Expert
- Scored
- Graded by a model
- Answers
- Agent task
- Tasks
- All public
- Strongest model tested
- GPT-5.5 #20 on the capability index
- Last in a system card
- October 2026
- Last model added
- October 2026
- Scores refreshed
- November 12th, 2026
In the authors’ words
AI agents are increasingly deployed across diverse domains to automate complex workflows through long-horizon and high-stakes action executions. Due to their high capability and flexibility, such agents raise significant security and safety concerns. A growing number of real-world incidents have shown that adversaries can easily manipulate agents into performing harmful actions, such as leaking API keys, deleting user data, or initiating unauthorized transactions. Evaluating agent security is inherently challenging, as agents operate in dynamic, untrusted environments involving external tools, heterogeneous data sources, and frequent user interactions. However, realistic, controllable, and reproducible environments for large-scale risk assessment remain largely underexplored. To address this gap, we introduce the DecodingTrust-Agent Platform (DTap), the first controllable and interactive red-teaming platform for AI agents, spanning 14 real-world domains and over 50 simulation environments that replicate widely used systems such as Google Workspace, Paypal, and Slack. To scale the risk assessment of agents in DTap, we further propose DTap-Red, the first autonomous red-teaming agent that systematically explores diverse injection vectors (e.g., prompt, tool, skill, environment, combinations) and autonomously discovers effective attack strategies tailored to varying malicious goals. Using DTap-Red, we curate DTap-Bench, a large-scale red-teaming dataset comprising high-quality instances across domains, each paired with a verifiable judge to automatically validate attack outcomes. Through DTap, we conduct large-scale evaluations of popular AI agents built on various backbone models, spanning security policies, risk categories, and attack strategies, revealing systematic vulnerability patterns and providing valuable insights for developing secure next-generation agents.
Claude Opus 4.6 leads with 21.2% among models released by April 2026
Best score per entry from the benchmark's own leaderboard, read on November 12th, 2026. Where a model ran with several settings or harnesses, we keep its best. Names in gray aren't in our model list: fine-tunes, agent systems, products and older models. They don't count toward leaders.
Muse Spark 1.3 leads with 5.60%, claims included
Best score per model from every source, including labs’ own numbers and claims Epoch AI collected from reports and papers. Labs pick their own settings, so a claim can beat an independent run of the same model.
The newest model with a score here came out in April 2026, and nobody has tested a newer one. Among the 20 highest-ranked models on the capability index, these have no score yet:
- Claude Fable 5.2
-
Gemini 4 Carbon
- GPT-6 Astra
- Claude Opus 5.5
- and 15 more
- 1 Claude Opus 4.6 21.2%
- 2 Claude Sonnet 4.5 26.6%
- 3 Pokee-Isaac 28B v0.1 28.1%
- 4 GPT-5.5 28.9%
- 5 GPT-5.2 38%
- 6 gpt-oss-120b 45.2%
- 7
Gemini 3 Pro 47.5%
- 8 GPT-5.4 48.9%
- 9
DeepSeek-V4-Pro 59.6%
Source: Official DTap Direct Misuse leaderboard
- 1
Muse Spark 1.3 5.60%
- 2 Claude Opus 4.6 21.2%
- 3 Claude Sonnet 4.5 26.6%
- 4 GPT-5.5 28.9%
- 5 GPT-5.2 38%
- 6 gpt-oss-120b 45.2%
- 7
Gemini 3 Pro 47.5%
- 8 GPT-5.4 48.9%
- 9
DeepSeek-V4-Pro 59.6%
Sources: Labs’ model cards and official DTap Direct Misuse leaderboard
| # | Entry | Score | Setting | Date | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Claude Opus 4.6 | 21.2% | OpenClaw | Feb 2026 | Official leaderboard |
| 2 | Claude Sonnet 4.5 | 26.6% | Claude Code | Sep 2025 | Official leaderboard |
| 3 | Pokee-Isaac 28B v0.1 | 28.1% | Pokee Harness | Official leaderboard | |
| 4 | GPT-5.5 | 28.9% | OpenClaw | Apr 2026 | Official leaderboard |
| 5 | GPT-5.2 | 38% | OpenClaw | Dec 2025 | Official leaderboard |
| 6 | gpt-oss-120b | 45.2% | OpenAI Agents | Aug 2025 | Official leaderboard |
| 7 | | 47.5% | Google ADK | Nov 2025 | Official leaderboard |
| 8 | GPT-5.4 | 48.9% | OpenAI Agents | Mar 2026 | Official leaderboard |
| 9 | | 59.6% | OpenClaw | Apr 2026 | Official leaderboard |
| # | Model | Score | Setting | Date | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | | 5.60% | Oct 2026 | Lab model card | |
| 2 | Claude Opus 4.6 | 21.2% | OpenClaw | Feb 2026 | Official leaderboard |
| 3 | Claude Sonnet 4.5 | 26.6% | Claude Code | Sep 2025 | Official leaderboard |
| 4 | GPT-5.5 | 28.9% | OpenClaw | Apr 2026 | Official leaderboard |
| 5 | GPT-5.2 | 38% | OpenClaw | Dec 2025 | Official leaderboard |
| 6 | gpt-oss-120b | 45.2% | OpenAI Agents | Aug 2025 | Official leaderboard |
| 7 | | 47.5% | Google ADK | Nov 2025 | Official leaderboard |
| 8 | GPT-5.4 | 48.9% | OpenAI Agents | Mar 2026 | Official leaderboard |
| 9 | | 59.6% | OpenClaw | Apr 2026 | Official leaderboard |
Labs report scores for 1 model in their cards. Switch the scores above to rank them together.
Number one over time 2 models have held number one with claims included since its release in May 2026
Lab claims count from the day the card came out, independent runs from the model’s release.
Source: Official DTap Direct Misuse leaderboard
Scores over time
All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.
Sources: Official DTap Direct Misuse leaderboard and labs’ model cards
Labs report it only in system cards
We read the headline results of 522 launch posts from 52 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.
One system card reports it
Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.
| Date | Document | Score | As the document writes it | Section |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oct 23, 2026 | | 5.6 | DTap Direct Misuse ASR, Muse Spark 1.3 (API) (Table 2, Figure 25). Muse system 10.0 | Robustness |
More in Safety and alignment
- FORTRESS In use Paired adversarial and benign national-security misuse prompts. Rubric-graded risk score on adversarial and over-refusal score on benign prompts. Claude Opus 5.5 5.78%
- StrongREJECT In use Forbidden-prompt jailbreak benchmark with a rubric grader that scores how useful a non-refusal actually is.
Inkling 98.6%
- Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts.
Gemini 4 Carbon 0%
- DistressBench In use Models reply as a chatbot to 718 simulated users in psychological crisis, in single-turn and multi-turn chats. Three judge models score replies against clinician-written rubrics.
Muse Spark 1.2 88.4%
- Lakera B3 (Backbone Breaker Benchmark) In use Crowdsourced prompt-injection attacks hit backbone LLMs inside agent threat snapshots at three defense levels. The score is attack resistance, 100 minus the board's vulnerability percentage. Claude Opus 4.5 89%
- IHEval In use Models face conflicts between system, user and tool instructions. Reports a composite score for following the higher-priority instruction. GPT-4o 70%