Benchmark Almanac

DTap Prompt Injection

Pokee-Isaac 28B v0.1 7.40% tops its leaderboard Claude Opus 4.6 8.60% leads the models we track
Claude Opus 4.6 8.60% leads since May 2026
Only in system cards

An attacker agent plants indirect prompt injections in tool and browser environments against a benign-user agent. Reports attack success rate.

Indirect-injection subset of the DecodingTrust-Agent Platform. 58 tool-use and 42 browser-use tasks.

Released
May 2026
Kind
Jailbreaks and prompt injection
Level
Expert
Scored
Graded by a model
Answers
Agent task
Tasks
All public
Strongest model tested
GPT-5.5 #20 on the capability index
Last in a system card
October 2026
Last model added
October 2026
Scores refreshed
November 12th, 2026

In the authors’ words

AI agents are increasingly deployed across diverse domains to automate complex workflows through long-horizon and high-stakes action executions. Due to their high capability and flexibility, such agents raise significant security and safety concerns. A growing number of real-world incidents have shown that adversaries can easily manipulate agents into performing harmful actions, such as leaking API keys, deleting user data, or initiating unauthorized transactions. Evaluating agent security is inherently challenging, as agents operate in dynamic, untrusted environments involving external tools, heterogeneous data sources, and frequent user interactions. However, realistic, controllable, and reproducible environments for large-scale risk assessment remain largely underexplored. To address this gap, we introduce the DecodingTrust-Agent Platform (DTap), the first controllable and interactive red-teaming platform for AI agents, spanning 14 real-world domains and over 50 simulation environments that replicate widely used systems such as Google Workspace, Paypal, and Slack. To scale the risk assessment of agents in DTap, we further propose DTap-Red, the first autonomous red-teaming agent that systematically explores diverse injection vectors (e.g., prompt, tool, skill, environment, combinations) and autonomously discovers effective attack strategies tailored to varying malicious goals. Using DTap-Red, we curate DTap-Bench, a large-scale red-teaming dataset comprising high-quality instances across domains, each paired with a verifiable judge to automatically validate attack outcomes. Through DTap, we conduct large-scale evaluations of popular AI agents built on various backbone models, spanning security policies, risk categories, and attack strategies, revealing systematic vulnerability patterns and providing valuable insights for developing secure next-generation agents.

Abstract of DecodingTrust-Agent Platform (DTap): A Controllable and Interactive Red-Teaming Platform for AI Agents (arXiv:2605.04808, CC0)
9
Entries on its own leaderboard, 8 models we track
1
System card reports it, from 1 lab

Pokee-Isaac 28B v0.1 tops the leaderboard with 7.40%

Best score per entry from the benchmark's own leaderboard, read on November 12th, 2026. Where a model ran with several settings or harnesses, we keep its best. Names in gray aren't in our model list: fine-tunes, agent systems, products and older models. They don't count toward leaders. The best model we track is Claude Opus 4.6, at 8.60%.

Claude Opus 4.6 leads with 8.60%, claims included

Best score per model from every source, including labs’ own numbers and claims Epoch AI collected from reports and papers. Labs pick their own settings, so a claim can beat an independent run of the same model.

The newest model with a score here came out in April 2026, and nobody has tested a newer one. Among the 20 highest-ranked models on the capability index, these have no score yet:

  1. 1 Pokee-Isaac 28B v0.1 paper_v1; indirect injection 7.40%
  2. 2 Claude Opus 4.6 paper_v1; indirect injection 8.60%
  3. 3 GPT-5.5 paper_v1; indirect injection 17.7%
  4. 4 Claude Sonnet 4.5 paper_v1; indirect injection 25.2%
  5. 5 gpt-oss-120b paper_v1; indirect injection 28.1%
  6. 6 GPT-5.2 paper_v1; indirect injection 35.2%
  7. 7 GPT-5.4 paper_v1; indirect injection 38.6%
  8. 8 DeepSeek-V4-Pro paper_v1; indirect injection 41.7%
  9. 9 Gemini 3 Pro paper_v1; indirect injection 54%

Source: Official DTap Prompt Injection leaderboard

#EntryScoreSettingDateSource
1 Pokee-Isaac 28B v0.1 7.40% paper_v1; indirect injection, Pokee Harness Official leaderboard
2 Claude Opus 4.6 8.60% paper_v1; indirect injection, Claude Code Feb 2026 Official leaderboard
3 GPT-5.5 17.7% paper_v1; indirect injection, OpenClaw Apr 2026 Official leaderboard
4 Claude Sonnet 4.5 25.2% paper_v1; indirect injection, Claude Code Sep 2025 Official leaderboard
5 gpt-oss-120b 28.1% paper_v1; indirect injection, OpenAI Agents Aug 2025 Official leaderboard
6 GPT-5.2 35.2% paper_v1; indirect injection, OpenClaw Dec 2025 Official leaderboard
7 GPT-5.4 38.6% paper_v1; indirect injection, OpenAI Agents Mar 2026 Official leaderboard
8 DeepSeek-V4-Pro 41.7% paper_v1; indirect injection, OpenClaw Apr 2026 Official leaderboard
9 Gemini 3 Pro 54% paper_v1; indirect injection, Google ADK Nov 2025 Official leaderboard
#ModelScoreSettingDateSource
1 Claude Opus 4.6 8.60% paper_v1; indirect injection, Claude Code Feb 2026 Official leaderboard
2 Muse Spark 1.3 17.5% Oct 2026 Lab model card
3 GPT-5.5 17.7% paper_v1; indirect injection, OpenClaw Apr 2026 Official leaderboard
4 Claude Sonnet 4.5 25.2% paper_v1; indirect injection, Claude Code Sep 2025 Official leaderboard
5 gpt-oss-120b 28.1% paper_v1; indirect injection, OpenAI Agents Aug 2025 Official leaderboard
6 GPT-5.2 35.2% paper_v1; indirect injection, OpenClaw Dec 2025 Official leaderboard
7 GPT-5.4 38.6% paper_v1; indirect injection, OpenAI Agents Mar 2026 Official leaderboard
8 DeepSeek-V4-Pro 41.7% paper_v1; indirect injection, OpenClaw Apr 2026 Official leaderboard
9 Gemini 3 Pro 54% paper_v1; indirect injection, Google ADK Nov 2025 Official leaderboard

Labs report scores for 1 model in their cards. Switch the scores above to rank them together.

Number one over time Number one over time

Lab claims count from the day the card came out, independent runs from the model’s release.

Anthropic
Own leaderboard Not tested since May 2026

Source: Official DTap Prompt Injection leaderboard

Scores over time

All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.

On the benchmark’s own leaderboard Reported by the lab in its model card Best so far
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 2026 2027 Claude Opus 4.6 Claude Sonnet 4.5 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 2026 2027 Claude Opus 4.6 Claude Sonnet 4.5

Sources: Official DTap Prompt Injection leaderboard and labs’ model cards

Labs report it only in system cards

We read the headline results of 522 launch posts from 52 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.

One system card reports it

Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.

DateDocumentScoreAs the document writes itSection
Oct 23, 2026 Muse Spark 1.3 system card 17.5 DTap Prompt Injection, browser-use IPI pass@1 ASR, Muse Spark 1.3 (API) (Table 2, Figure 29). Tool-use subset 4.0 Robustness

More in Safety and alignment

All 465 in Safety and alignment
  • FORTRESS In use Paired adversarial and benign national-security misuse prompts. Rubric-graded risk score on adversarial and over-refusal score on benign prompts. Claude Opus 5.5 5.78%
  • StrongREJECT In use Forbidden-prompt jailbreak benchmark with a rubric grader that scores how useful a non-refusal actually is. Inkling 98.6%
  • Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts. Gemini 4 Carbon 0%
  • DistressBench In use Models reply as a chatbot to 718 simulated users in psychological crisis, in single-turn and multi-turn chats. Three judge models score replies against clinician-written rubrics. Muse Spark 1.2 88.4%
  • Lakera B3 (Backbone Breaker Benchmark) In use Crowdsourced prompt-injection attacks hit backbone LLMs inside agent threat snapshots at three defense levels. The score is attack resistance, 100 minus the board's vulnerability percentage. Claude Opus 4.5 89%
  • IHEval In use Models face conflicts between system, user and tool instructions. Reports a composite score for following the higher-priority instruction. GPT-4o 70%