Self-proliferation challenges (Phuong et al. 2024)
Gemma 2 27B 0% Agents try 10 end-to-end tasks such as installing a wallet or deploying a model on a cloud server, with 45 milestone substeps.
Reports give challenges passed end to end, milestones passed and expert bits needed.
- Made by
- Google DeepMind
- Released
- March 2024
- Kind
- Dangerous capabilities
- Level
- Expert
- Scored
- Checked automatically
- Answers
- Agent task
- Tasks
- All public
- Strongest model tested
- Gemma 2 27B #189 on the capability index
- Last in a system card
- July 2024
- Last model added
- July 2024
In the authors’ words
To understand the risks posed by a new AI system, we must understand what it can and cannot do. Building on prior work, we introduce a programme of new "dangerous capability" evaluations and pilot them on Gemini 1.0 models. Our evaluations cover four areas: (1) persuasion and deception; (2) cyber-security; (3) self-proliferation; and (4) self-reasoning. We do not find evidence of strong dangerous capabilities in the models we evaluated, but we flag early warning signs. Our goal is to help advance a rigorous science of dangerous capability evaluation, in preparation for future models.
Gemma 2 27B leads with 0%
Best score per model as labs report them in their own cards. Labs pick their own settings, so these compare less cleanly than independent runs.
Source: Labs’ model cards
| # | Model | Score | Setting | Date | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Gemma 2 27B | 0% | Jul 2024 | Lab model card |
Scores over time
All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.
Source: Labs’ model cards
Labs report it only in system cards
We read the headline results of 522 launch posts from 52 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.
One system card reports it
Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.
| Date | Document | Score | As the document writes it | Section |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jul 31, 2024 | Gemma 2 27B technical report | 0 | Self-proliferation, challenges passed end-to-end 0/10 (Table 21). Challenges with success on all milestones 1/10, total milestones 22/45 (49%), expert bits 12,462 | Autonomy |
More in Safety and alignment
- FORTRESS In use Paired adversarial and benign national-security misuse prompts. Rubric-graded risk score on adversarial and over-refusal score on benign prompts. Claude Opus 5.5 5.78%
- StrongREJECT In use Forbidden-prompt jailbreak benchmark with a rubric grader that scores how useful a non-refusal actually is.
Inkling 98.6% - Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts. Gemini 4 Carbon 0%
- DistressBench In use Models reply as a chatbot to 718 simulated users in psychological crisis, in single-turn and multi-turn chats. Three judge models score replies against clinician-written rubrics.
Muse Spark 1.2 88.4% - Lakera B3 (Backbone Breaker Benchmark) In use Crowdsourced prompt-injection attacks hit backbone LLMs inside agent threat snapshots at three defense levels. The score is attack resistance, 100 minus the board's vulnerability percentage. Claude Opus 4.5 89%
- IHEval In use Models face conflicts between system, user and tool instructions. Reports a composite score for following the higher-priority instruction. GPT-4o 70%