Acting on a presumed grader and digging for evaluation clues (Anthropic)
Models work on coding evaluations. A grader flags transcripts that shape answers to a presumed grader or search for clues about grading.
Reported as two separate flag rates with no overall rate.
- Made by
- Anthropic
- Released
- September 2026
- Kind
- Deception and alignment
- Level
- Expert
- Scored
- Graded by a model
- Answers
- Agent task
- Tasks
- Kept private
- Last in a system card
- October 2026
- Last model added
- October 2026
3
System cards report it, from 1 lab
No scores here yet
No lab, leaderboard or Epoch AI run has reported a score for Acting on a presumed grader and digging for evaluation clues (Anthropic) yet.
Labs report it only in system cards
We read the headline results of 522 launch posts from 52 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.
3 system cards report it, from 1 lab
Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.
| Date | Document | Score | As the document writes it | Section |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oct 7, 2026 | Claude Haiku 5.5 system card | Acting on a presumed grader 0.50 (3/597) and digging for evaluation clues 0.84 (5/597) in coding evaluations, no overall (Figure 6.4.1.B) | Monitorability | |
| Sep 28, 2026 | Claude Sonnet 5.5 system card | Acting on a presumed grader 2 of 600 and digging for evaluation clues 1 of 600 in coding evaluations, no overall (6.4.1, Figure 6.4.1.C) | Monitorability | |
| Sep 22, 2026 | Claude Opus 5.5 system card | Acting on a presumed grader 2 of 695 and digging for evaluation clues 1 of 695 in coding evaluations, no overall (6.6.2, Figure 6.6.2.B) | Monitorability |
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