Benchmark Almanac

ImpossibleBench

Only in system cards

Coding agents get tasks whose unit tests conflict with the specification. Reports how often they cheat by changing tests or special-casing.

Measures reward hacking as a cheating rate.

Made by
Zhong, Raghunathan and Carlini
Released
October 2025
Kind
Deception and alignment
Level
Expert
Scored
Checked automatically
Answers
Code
Tasks
All public
Strongest model tested
Muse Spark #53 on the capability index
Last in a system card
June 2026
Last model added
June 2026

In the authors’ words

The tendency to find and exploit "shortcuts" to complete tasks poses significant risks for reliable assessment and deployment of large language models (LLMs). For example, an LLM agent with access to unit tests may delete failing tests rather than fix the underlying bug. Such behavior undermines both the validity of benchmark results and the reliability of real-world LLM coding assistant deployments. To quantify, study, and mitigate such behavior, we introduce ImpossibleBench, a benchmark framework that systematically measures LLM agents' propensity to exploit test cases. ImpossibleBench creates "impossible" variants of tasks from existing benchmarks like LiveCodeBench and SWE-bench by introducing direct conflicts between the natural-language specification and the unit tests. We measure an agent's "cheating rate" as its pass rate on these impossible tasks, where any pass necessarily implies a specification-violating shortcut. As a practical framework, ImpossibleBench is not just an evaluation but a versatile tool. We demonstrate its utility for: (1) studying model behaviors, revealing more fine-grained details of cheating behaviors from simple test modification to complex operator overloading; (2) context engineering, showing how prompt, test access and feedback loop affect cheating rates; and (3) developing monitoring tools, providing a testbed with verified deceptive solutions. We hope ImpossibleBench serves as a useful framework for building more robust and reliable LLM systems. Our implementation can be found at https://github.com/safety-research/impossiblebench.

Abstract of ImpossibleBench: Measuring LLMs' Propensity of Exploiting Test Cases (arXiv:2510.20270, CC0)
1
Model scored in lab cards
1
System card reports it, from 1 lab

Muse Spark leads with 0%

Best score per model as labs report them in their own cards. Labs pick their own settings, so these compare less cleanly than independent runs.

  1. 1 Muse Spark 0%

Source: Labs’ model cards

#ModelScoreSettingDateSource
1 Muse Spark 0% Jun 2026 Lab model card

Scores over time

All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.

Reported by the lab in its model card
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 2026 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 2026

Source: Labs’ model cards

Labs report it only in system cards

We read the headline results of 522 launch posts from 52 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.

One system card reports it

Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.

DateDocumentScoreAs the document writes itSection
Jun 12, 2026 Muse Spark system card 0 ImpossibleBench cheating rate (Table 2, Figure 39) Alignment

More in Safety and alignment

All 465 in Safety and alignment
  • FORTRESS In use Paired adversarial and benign national-security misuse prompts. Rubric-graded risk score on adversarial and over-refusal score on benign prompts. Claude Opus 5.5 5.78%
  • StrongREJECT In use Forbidden-prompt jailbreak benchmark with a rubric grader that scores how useful a non-refusal actually is. Inkling 98.6%
  • Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts. Gemini 4 Carbon 0%
  • DistressBench In use Models reply as a chatbot to 718 simulated users in psychological crisis, in single-turn and multi-turn chats. Three judge models score replies against clinician-written rubrics. Muse Spark 1.2 88.4%
  • Lakera B3 (Backbone Breaker Benchmark) In use Crowdsourced prompt-injection attacks hit backbone LLMs inside agent threat snapshots at three defense levels. The score is attack resistance, 100 minus the board's vulnerability percentage. Claude Opus 4.5 89%
  • IHEval In use Models face conflicts between system, user and tool instructions. Reports a composite score for following the higher-priority instruction. GPT-4o 70%