Benchmark Almanac

Prompt injection test suite for LLM-based machine translation

Only in system cards

Translation systems receive TruthfulQA questions with injected instructions to answer instead of translate, across WMT 2024 language pairs. Scored by the share of outputs that answer rather than translate.

Released as a WMT 2024 test suite. Cohere reports failure rates on its 817-question direct translation set for Command A Translate.

Released
October 2024
Kind
Jailbreaks and prompt injection
Level
Everyday
Scored
Checked automatically
Answers
Open-ended
Tasks
All public
Last in a system card
September 2025
Last model added
September 2025

In the authors’ words

LLM-based NLP systems typically work by embedding their input data into prompt templates which contain instructions and/or in-context examples, creating queries which are submitted to a LLM, and then parsing the LLM response in order to generate the system outputs. Prompt Injection Attacks (PIAs) are a type of subversion of these systems where a malicious user crafts special inputs which interfere with the prompt templates, causing the LLM to respond in ways unintended by the system designer. Recently, Sun and Miceli-Barone proposed a class of PIAs against LLM-based machine translation. Specifically, the task is to translate questions from the TruthfulQA test suite, where an adversarial prompt is prepended to the questions, instructing the system to ignore the translation instruction and answer the questions instead. In this test suite, we extend this approach to all the language pairs of the WMT 2024 General Machine Translation task. Moreover, we include additional attack formats in addition to the one originally studied.

Abstract of A test suite of prompt injection attacks for LLM-based machine translation (arXiv:2410.05047, CC0)
1
Model scored in lab cards
1
System card reports it, from 1 lab

Command A Translate leads with 0.30%

Best score per model as labs report them in their own cards. Labs pick their own settings, so these compare less cleanly than independent runs.

  1. 1 Command A Translate 0.30%

Source: Labs’ model cards

#ModelScoreSettingDateSource
1 Command A Translate 0.30% Sep 2025 Lab model card

Scores over time

All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.

Reported by the lab in its model card
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Command A Translate 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Command A Translate

Source: Labs’ model cards

Labs report it only in system cards

We read the headline results of 522 launch posts from 52 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.

One system card reports it

Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.

DateDocumentScoreAs the document writes itSection
Sep 26, 2025 Command A Translate technical report 0.3 Adversarial prompt injection, percentage of failed translations on the question mark test, Avg over 23 languages, lower is better (Table 6) Robustness

More in Safety and alignment

All 465 in Safety and alignment
  • FORTRESS In use Paired adversarial and benign national-security misuse prompts. Rubric-graded risk score on adversarial and over-refusal score on benign prompts. Claude Opus 5.5 5.78%
  • StrongREJECT In use Forbidden-prompt jailbreak benchmark with a rubric grader that scores how useful a non-refusal actually is. Inkling 98.6%
  • Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts. Gemini 4 Carbon 0%
  • DistressBench In use Models reply as a chatbot to 718 simulated users in psychological crisis, in single-turn and multi-turn chats. Three judge models score replies against clinician-written rubrics. Muse Spark 1.2 88.4%
  • Lakera B3 (Backbone Breaker Benchmark) In use Crowdsourced prompt-injection attacks hit backbone LLMs inside agent threat snapshots at three defense levels. The score is attack resistance, 100 minus the board's vulnerability percentage. Claude Opus 4.5 89%
  • IHEval In use Models face conflicts between system, user and tool instructions. Reports a composite score for following the higher-priority instruction. GPT-4o 70%