Benchmark Almanac

Muse-targeted cyber misuse and violation red-teaming

Only in system cards

An automated red-teaming agent tries to misuse the Muse runtime across six attack categories. Reports attack success rate per category.

In-house Meta pre-launch stress test of early Muse builds. No overall score.

Made by
Meta
Kind
Refusing harmful requests
Level
Expert
Scored
Graded by a model
Answers
Agent task
Tasks
Kept private
Last in a system card
October 2026
Last model added
October 2026
1
System card reports it, from 1 lab

No scores here yet

No lab, leaderboard or Epoch AI run has reported a score for Muse-targeted cyber misuse and violation red-teaming yet.

Labs report it only in system cards

We read the headline results of 522 launch posts from 52 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.

One system card reports it

Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.

DateDocumentScoreAs the document writes itSection
Oct 23, 2026 Muse Spark 1.3 system card Muse-Targeted Cyber Misuse and Violation, ASR in 6 categories, no overall (Figure 12). Range 0.0 to 3.7, pre-release Muse builds Cyber risk

More in Safety and alignment

All 465 in Safety and alignment
  • FORTRESS In use Paired adversarial and benign national-security misuse prompts. Rubric-graded risk score on adversarial and over-refusal score on benign prompts. Claude Opus 5.5 5.78%
  • StrongREJECT In use Forbidden-prompt jailbreak benchmark with a rubric grader that scores how useful a non-refusal actually is. Inkling 98.6%
  • Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts. Gemini 4 Carbon 0%
  • DistressBench In use Models reply as a chatbot to 718 simulated users in psychological crisis, in single-turn and multi-turn chats. Three judge models score replies against clinician-written rubrics. Muse Spark 1.2 88.4%
  • Lakera B3 (Backbone Breaker Benchmark) In use Crowdsourced prompt-injection attacks hit backbone LLMs inside agent threat snapshots at three defense levels. The score is attack resistance, 100 minus the board's vulnerability percentage. Claude Opus 4.5 89%
  • IHEval In use Models face conflicts between system, user and tool instructions. Reports a composite score for following the higher-priority instruction. GPT-4o 70%