Benchmark Almanac

Overconfidence: verifying command-line syntax (Anthropic)

Only in system cards

Agents are asked for an exact invocation of an unfamiliar command-line tool. Graders score from 1 to 5 whether they check documentation before running commands.

In-house Anthropic evaluation. The tasks are not public.

Made by
Anthropic
Kind
Deception and alignment
Level
Expert
Scored
Graded by a model
Answers
Agent task
Tasks
Kept private
Strongest model tested
Claude Opus 5 #10 on the capability index
Last in a system card
July 2026
Last model added
July 2026
2
Models scored in lab cards
2
System cards report it, from 1 lab

Claude Opus 5 leads with 4.90

Best score per model as labs report them in their own cards. Labs pick their own settings, so these compare less cleanly than independent runs.

  1. 1 Claude Opus 5 4.90
  2. 2 Claude Opus 4.8 4.51

Source: Labs’ model cards

#ModelScoreSettingDateSource
1 Claude Opus 5 4.90 Jul 2026 Lab model card
2 Claude Opus 4.8 4.51 May 2026 Lab model card

Scores over time

All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.

Reported by the lab in its model card
4.50 4.60 4.70 4.80 4.90 2026 4.50 4.60 4.70 4.80 4.90 2026

Source: Labs’ model cards

Labs report it only in system cards

We read the headline results of 522 launch posts from 52 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.

2 system cards report it, from 1 lab

Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.

DateDocumentScoreAs the document writes itSection
Jul 24, 2026 Claude Opus 5 system card 4.9 Overconfidence, verifying command-line syntax, process quality from 1 to 5, higher is better, printed on chart (6.5.4, Figure 6.5.4.A) Alignment
May 28, 2026 Claude Opus 4.8 system card 4.51 Overconfidence on unfamiliar command-line tools, misleading-example variant process quality 4.51 of 5. No-tools variant confidently-wrong rate 0.03, printed on chart (6.3.6.4, Figure 6.3.6.4.A) Alignment

More in Safety and alignment

All 465 in Safety and alignment
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  • DistressBench In use Models reply as a chatbot to 718 simulated users in psychological crisis, in single-turn and multi-turn chats. Three judge models score replies against clinician-written rubrics. Muse Spark 1.2 88.4%
  • Lakera B3 (Backbone Breaker Benchmark) In use Crowdsourced prompt-injection attacks hit backbone LLMs inside agent threat snapshots at three defense levels. The score is attack resistance, 100 minus the board's vulnerability percentage. Claude Opus 4.5 89%
  • IHEval In use Models face conflicts between system, user and tool instructions. Reports a composite score for following the higher-priority instruction. GPT-4o 70%