Benchmark Almanac

PrivacyLens

Zephyr 7B Beta 19.3% leads since August 2024
Zephyr 7B Beta 19.3% leads since August 2024
Only in system cards

Language model agents write emails, posts or messages from a prior tool trajectory without leaking sensitive details. A judge scores information leakage and helpfulness.

Labs report the leakage rate over 493 prompts, where lower is better, often with a helpfulness score beside it.

Released
August 2024
Kind
Refusing harmful requests
Level
Everyday
Scored
Graded by a model
Answers
Open-ended
Tasks
All public
Strongest model tested
Claude 3 Sonnet #186 on the capability index
Last in a system card
October 2026
Last model added
October 2026
Scores refreshed
November 12th, 2026

In the authors’ words

As language models (LMs) are widely utilized in personalized communication scenarios (e.g., sending emails, writing social media posts) and endowed with a certain level of agency, ensuring they act in accordance with the contextual privacy norms becomes increasingly critical. However, quantifying the privacy norm awareness of LMs and the emerging privacy risk in LM-mediated communication is challenging due to (1) the contextual and long-tailed nature of privacy-sensitive cases, and (2) the lack of evaluation approaches that capture realistic application scenarios. To address these challenges, we propose PrivacyLens, a novel framework designed to extend privacy-sensitive seeds into expressive vignettes and further into agent trajectories, enabling multi-level evaluation of privacy leakage in LM agents' actions. We instantiate PrivacyLens with a collection of privacy norms grounded in privacy literature and crowdsourced seeds. Using this dataset, we reveal a discrepancy between LM performance in answering probing questions and their actual behavior when executing user instructions in an agent setup. State-of-the-art LMs, like GPT-4 and Llama-3-70B, leak sensitive information in 25.68% and 38.69% of cases, even when prompted with privacy-enhancing instructions. We also demonstrate the dynamic nature of PrivacyLens by extending each seed into multiple trajectories to red-team LM privacy leakage risk. Dataset and code are available at https://github.com/SALT-NLP/PrivacyLens.

Abstract of PrivacyLens: Evaluating Privacy Norm Awareness of Language Models in Action (arXiv:2409.00138, CC0)
1
Model scored in lab cards
1
System card reports it, from 1 lab

Muse Glimmer leads with 49.2%

Best score per model as labs report them in their own cards. Labs pick their own settings, so these compare less cleanly than independent runs.

Zephyr 7B Beta leads with 19.3% across all independent runs

Best score per model across the official leaderboard, Epoch AI’s own runs and any board Epoch AI copied. Each bar and row names its source.

Zephyr 7B Beta leads with 19.3%, claims included

Best score per model from every source, including labs’ own numbers and claims Epoch AI collected from reports and papers. Labs pick their own settings, so a claim can beat an independent run of the same model.

  1. 1 Muse Glimmer 49.2%

Source: Labs’ model cards

Sources: Official PrivacyLens leaderboard and labs’ model cards

#ModelScoreSettingDateSource
1 Muse Glimmer 49.2% Oct 2026 Lab model card
#ModelScoreSettingDateSource
1 Zephyr 7B Beta 19.3% Privacy-Enhancing Prompt Oct 2023 Official leaderboard
2 Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2 33.5% Basic Prompt Dec 2023 Official leaderboard
3 Claude 3 Sonnet 37.3% Privacy-Enhancing Prompt Feb 2024 Official leaderboard
4 Claude 3 Haiku 39% Basic Prompt Mar 2024 Official leaderboard
#ModelScoreSettingDateSource
1 Zephyr 7B Beta 19.3% Privacy-Enhancing Prompt Oct 2023 Official leaderboard
2 Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2 33.5% Basic Prompt Dec 2023 Official leaderboard
3 Claude 3 Sonnet 37.3% Privacy-Enhancing Prompt Feb 2024 Official leaderboard
4 Claude 3 Haiku 39% Basic Prompt Mar 2024 Official leaderboard
5 Muse Glimmer 49.2% Oct 2026 Lab model card

The benchmark's own leaderboard has 9 entries, 4 of them models we track. Switch the scores above to rank them together.

Scores at each effort level

Models the leaderboard ran at two or more effort levels. We don’t have enough cost data here to say what the extra effort costs.

Lowest effort to highest, light to dark
Claude 3 Haiku
Basic Prompt
39%
Claude 3 Sonnet
Privacy-Enh…
38.3%
Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2
Basic Prompt Privacy-Enh…
36.1%
Zephyr 7B Beta
Privacy-Enh… Basic Prompt
24.1%

Source: Official PrivacyLens leaderboard

ModelEffortHarnessScoreCost per taskOutput tokens
Claude 3 Haiku Basic Prompt 39%
Claude 3 Haiku Privacy-Enhancing Prompt 39%
Claude 3 Sonnet Basic Prompt 38.3%
Claude 3 Sonnet Privacy-Enhancing Prompt 37.3%
Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2 Privacy-Enhancing Prompt 36.1%
Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2 Basic Prompt 33.5%
Zephyr 7B Beta Basic Prompt 24.1%
Zephyr 7B Beta Privacy-Enhancing Prompt 19.3%

Number one over time Number one over time Number one over time

Lab claims count from the day the card came out, independent runs from the model’s release.

Hugging Face
Own leaderboard Not tested since Aug 2024

Source: Official PrivacyLens leaderboard

Scores over time

All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.

On the benchmark’s own leaderboard Reported by the lab in its model card Best so far
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 2024 2025 2026 Zephyr 7B Beta Zephyr 7B Beta 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 2024 2025 2026 Zephyr 7B Beta

Sources: Official PrivacyLens leaderboard and labs’ model cards

Labs report it only in system cards

We read the headline results of 522 launch posts from 52 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.

One system card reports it

Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.

DateDocumentScoreAs the document writes itSection
Oct 19, 2026 Muse Glimmer technical report 49.2 PrivacyLens leakage, lower is better, 493 prompts, high (Table 5) Safety

More in Safety and alignment

All 465 in Safety and alignment
  • FORTRESS In use Paired adversarial and benign national-security misuse prompts. Rubric-graded risk score on adversarial and over-refusal score on benign prompts. Claude Opus 5.5 5.78%
  • StrongREJECT In use Forbidden-prompt jailbreak benchmark with a rubric grader that scores how useful a non-refusal actually is. Inkling 98.6%
  • Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts. Gemini 4 Carbon 0%
  • DistressBench In use Models reply as a chatbot to 718 simulated users in psychological crisis, in single-turn and multi-turn chats. Three judge models score replies against clinician-written rubrics. Muse Spark 1.2 88.4%
  • Lakera B3 (Backbone Breaker Benchmark) In use Crowdsourced prompt-injection attacks hit backbone LLMs inside agent threat snapshots at three defense levels. The score is attack resistance, 100 minus the board's vulnerability percentage. Claude Opus 4.5 89%
  • IHEval In use Models face conflicts between system, user and tool instructions. Reports a composite score for following the higher-priority instruction. GPT-4o 70%