ROK-FORTRESS

In the authors’ words

Safety evaluations for large language models (LLMs) increasingly target high-stakes National Security and Public Safety (NSPS) risks, yet multilingual safety is mostly assessed through translation-only benchmarks that preserve the underlying scenario, leaving how language and geopolitical context interact largely unexamined beyond a few language pairs. We introduce ROK-FORTRESS, a bilingual, culturally adversarial NSPS benchmark that uses the English-Korean language pair and U.S.-ROK geopolitical axis as a case study, separating the effects of language and geopolitical grounding via a transcreation matrix: adversarial intents are evaluated under controlled combinations of (i) English versus Korean language and (ii) U.S. versus Korean entities, institutions, and operational details. Each adversarial prompt is paired with a dual-use benign counterpart to quantify over-refusal, and responses are scored by calibrated LLM-as-a-judge panels using expert-crafted, prompt-specific binary rubrics. Across a dual-track set of frontier and Korean-optimized models, we find a consistent suppression effect in Korean variants and substantial model-to-model variation in how geopolitical grounding interacts with language; in a subset of models, Korean grounding further mitigates the language-driven suppression. This indicates that, at least in the English-Korean case, safety behavior is shaped by language-as-risk signals and context interactions that translation-only evaluations miss. A direct-request ablation that strips jailbreak wrappers separates a small but persistent reduction for closed-source models from a larger, wrapper-dependent effect that reverses for open-source models, suggesting part of the Korean suppression reflects prompt specialization rather than intrinsic language-based safety alignment. The transcreation matrix methodology is designed to generalize to other language-culture pairs.