RTP-LX
Models continue or judge toxic prompts hand-translated from RealToxicityPrompts into dozens of languages, with native-speaker labels. Measures toxic output and toxicity detection.
AAAI 2025. The paper covers 28 languages and the repo now lists 38. Microsoft reported Phi-3.5 results on it in its Phi-3 safety post-training paper.
- Made by
- Microsoft (de Wynter et al.)
- Released
- April 2024
- Kind
- Bias, fairness and politics
- Level
- Everyday
- Scored
- Graded by a model
- Answers
- Open-ended
- Tasks
- All public
In the authors’ words
Large language models (LLMs) and small language models (SLMs) are being adopted at remarkable speed, although their safety still remains a serious concern. With the advent of multilingual S/LLMs, the question now becomes a matter of scale: can we expand multilingual safety evaluations of these models with the same velocity at which they are deployed? To this end, we introduce RTP-LX, a human-transcreated and human-annotated corpus of toxic prompts and outputs in 28 languages. RTP-LX follows participatory design practices, and a portion of the corpus is especially designed to detect culturally-specific toxic language. We evaluate 10 S/LLMs on their ability to detect toxic content in a culturally-sensitive, multilingual scenario. We find that, although they typically score acceptably in terms of accuracy, they have low agreement with human judges when scoring holistically the toxicity of a prompt; and have difficulty discerning harm in context-dependent scenarios, particularly with subtle-yet-harmful content (e.g. microaggressions, bias). We release this dataset to contribute to further reduce harmful uses of these models and improve their safe deployment.
No scores here yet
No lab, leaderboard or Epoch AI run has reported a score for RTP-LX yet.
No lab model card reports it yet
We read the headline results of 522 launch posts from 52 labs, and none of them list this benchmark.
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