Benchmark Almanac

SafetyBench

GLM-4.5 89.9%
Only in system cards

Models answer 11,435 multiple choice questions on seven safety topics in Chinese and English, such as ethics, illegal activities and privacy.

Tsinghua CoAI benchmark, ACL 2024. Test answers were open-sourced in July 2025.

Released
September 2023
Kind
Refusing harmful requests
Level
Everyday
Scored
Checked automatically
Answers
Multiple choice
Tasks
All public
Last in a system card
August 2025
Last model added
August 2025

In the authors’ words

With the rapid development of Large Language Models (LLMs), increasing attention has been paid to their safety concerns. Consequently, evaluating the safety of LLMs has become an essential task for facilitating the broad applications of LLMs. Nevertheless, the absence of comprehensive safety evaluation benchmarks poses a significant impediment to effectively assess and enhance the safety of LLMs. In this work, we present SafetyBench, a comprehensive benchmark for evaluating the safety of LLMs, which comprises 11,435 diverse multiple choice questions spanning across 7 distinct categories of safety concerns. Notably, SafetyBench also incorporates both Chinese and English data, facilitating the evaluation in both languages. Our extensive tests over 25 popular Chinese and English LLMs in both zero-shot and few-shot settings reveal a substantial performance advantage for GPT-4 over its counterparts, and there is still significant room for improving the safety of current LLMs. We also demonstrate that the measured safety understanding abilities in SafetyBench are correlated with safety generation abilities. Data and evaluation guidelines are available at https://github.com/thu-coai/SafetyBenchhttps://github.com/thu-coai/SafetyBench. Submission entrance and leaderboard are available at https://llmbench.ai/safetyhttps://llmbench.ai/safety.

Abstract of SafetyBench: Evaluating the Safety of Large Language Models (arXiv:2309.07045, CC0)
2
Models scored in lab cards
2
System cards report it, from 1 lab

GLM-4.5 leads with 89.9%

Best score per model as labs report them in their own cards. Labs pick their own settings, so these compare less cleanly than independent runs.

  1. 1 GLM-4.5 89.9%
  2. 2 GLM-4.5-Air 87.8%

Source: Labs’ model cards

#ModelScoreSettingDateSource
1 GLM-4.5 89.9% Aug 2025 Lab model card
2 GLM-4.5-Air 87.8% Aug 2025 Lab model card

Z.ai’s own number for GLM-4.5 passed 85% in August 2025

All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.

Reported by the lab in its model card
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Near the ceiling (85%) GLM-4.5 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Near the ceiling (85%) GLM-4.5

Source: Labs’ model cards

Labs report it only in system cards

We read the headline results of 522 launch posts from 52 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.

2 system cards report it, from 1 lab

Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.

DateDocumentScoreAs the document writes itSection
Aug 8, 2025 GLM-4.5 technical report 89.9 SafetyBench, Average (Table 7; text gives 89.87 for GLM-4.5) Safety
Aug 8, 2025 GLM-4.5-Air technical report 87.8 SafetyBench, Average (Table 7; text gives 89.87 for GLM-4.5) Safety

More in Safety and alignment

All 465 in Safety and alignment
  • FORTRESS In use Paired adversarial and benign national-security misuse prompts. Rubric-graded risk score on adversarial and over-refusal score on benign prompts. Claude Opus 5.5 5.78%
  • StrongREJECT In use Forbidden-prompt jailbreak benchmark with a rubric grader that scores how useful a non-refusal actually is. Inkling 98.6%
  • Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts. Gemini 4 Carbon 0%
  • DistressBench In use Models reply as a chatbot to 718 simulated users in psychological crisis, in single-turn and multi-turn chats. Three judge models score replies against clinician-written rubrics. Muse Spark 1.2 88.4%
  • Lakera B3 (Backbone Breaker Benchmark) In use Crowdsourced prompt-injection attacks hit backbone LLMs inside agent threat snapshots at three defense levels. The score is attack resistance, 100 minus the board's vulnerability percentage. Claude Opus 4.5 89%
  • IHEval In use Models face conflicts between system, user and tool instructions. Reports a composite score for following the higher-priority instruction. GPT-4o 70%