Benchmark Almanac

SkillInject

Only in system cards

Agents use a skill file that carries an adversarial instruction while doing a legitimate task. Reports how often the agent follows the injection.

Measures agent vulnerability to skill file attacks.

Made by
Schmotz et al.
Released
February 2026
Kind
Jailbreaks and prompt injection
Level
Expert
Scored
Graded by a model
Answers
Agent task
Tasks
All public
Strongest model tested
Muse Spark 1.3 #26 on the capability index
Last in a system card
October 2026
Last model added
October 2026

In the authors’ words

LLM agents are evolving rapidly, powered by code execution, tools, and the recently introduced agent skills feature. Skills allow users to extend LLM applications with specialized third-party code, knowledge, and instructions. Although this can extend agent capabilities to new domains, it creates an increasingly complex agent supply chain, offering new surfaces for prompt injection attacks. We identify skill-based prompt injection as a significant threat and introduce SkillInject, a benchmark evaluating the susceptibility of widely-used LLM agents to injections through skill files. SkillInject contains 202 injection-task pairs with attacks ranging from obviously malicious injections to subtle, context-dependent attacks hidden in otherwise legitimate instructions. We evaluate frontier LLMs on SkillInject, measuring both security in terms of harmful instruction avoidance and utility in terms of legitimate instruction compliance. Our results show that today's agents are highly vulnerable with up to 80% attack success rate with frontier models, often executing extremely harmful instructions including data exfiltration, destructive action, and ransomware-like behavior. They furthermore suggest that this problem will not be solved through model scaling or simple input filtering, but that robust agent security will require context-aware authorization frameworks. Our benchmark is available at https://www.skill-inject.com/.

Abstract of Skill-Inject: Measuring Agent Vulnerability to Skill File Attacks (arXiv:2602.20156, CC0)
1
Model scored in lab cards
1
System card reports it, from 1 lab

Muse Spark 1.3 leads with 0.60%

Best score per model as labs report them in their own cards. Labs pick their own settings, so these compare less cleanly than independent runs.

  1. 1 Muse Spark 1.3 0.60%

Source: Labs’ model cards

#ModelScoreSettingDateSource
1 Muse Spark 1.3 0.60% Oct 2026 Lab model card

Scores over time

All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.

Reported by the lab in its model card
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 2027 Muse Spark 1.3 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 2027 Muse Spark 1.3

Source: Labs’ model cards

Labs report it only in system cards

We read the headline results of 522 launch posts from 52 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.

One system card reports it

Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.

DateDocumentScoreAs the document writes itSection
Oct 23, 2026 Muse Spark 1.3 system card 0.6 SkillInject pass@1 ASR, Muse Spark 1.3 (API) (Table 2, Figure 28). Muse system 3.7 Robustness

More in Safety and alignment

All 465 in Safety and alignment
  • FORTRESS In use Paired adversarial and benign national-security misuse prompts. Rubric-graded risk score on adversarial and over-refusal score on benign prompts. Claude Opus 5.5 5.78%
  • StrongREJECT In use Forbidden-prompt jailbreak benchmark with a rubric grader that scores how useful a non-refusal actually is. Inkling 98.6%
  • Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts. Gemini 4 Carbon 0%
  • DistressBench In use Models reply as a chatbot to 718 simulated users in psychological crisis, in single-turn and multi-turn chats. Three judge models score replies against clinician-written rubrics. Muse Spark 1.2 88.4%
  • Lakera B3 (Backbone Breaker Benchmark) In use Crowdsourced prompt-injection attacks hit backbone LLMs inside agent threat snapshots at three defense levels. The score is attack resistance, 100 minus the board's vulnerability percentage. Claude Opus 4.5 89%
  • IHEval In use Models face conflicts between system, user and tool instructions. Reports a composite score for following the higher-priority instruction. GPT-4o 70%