Benchmark Almanac

SycophancyEval (Sharma et al.)

Only in system cards

Models answer questions and give feedback while users state opinions. Measures accuracy shifts and feedback positivity caused by user views.

Anthropic system cards replicate the answer bias and feedback bias settings from the paper.

Released
October 2023
Kind
Deception and alignment
Level
Everyday
Scored
Graded by a model
Answers
Open-ended
Tasks
All public
Last in a system card
May 2025
Last model added
May 2025

In the authors’ words

Human feedback is commonly utilized to finetune AI assistants. But human feedback may also encourage model responses that match user beliefs over truthful ones, a behaviour known as sycophancy. We investigate the prevalence of sycophancy in models whose finetuning procedure made use of human feedback, and the potential role of human preference judgments in such behavior. We first demonstrate that five state-of-the-art AI assistants consistently exhibit sycophancy across four varied free-form text-generation tasks. To understand if human preferences drive this broadly observed behavior, we analyze existing human preference data. We find that when a response matches a user's views, it is more likely to be preferred. Moreover, both humans and preference models (PMs) prefer convincingly-written sycophantic responses over correct ones a non-negligible fraction of the time. Optimizing model outputs against PMs also sometimes sacrifices truthfulness in favor of sycophancy. Overall, our results indicate that sycophancy is a general behavior of state-of-the-art AI assistants, likely driven in part by human preference judgments favoring sycophantic responses.

Abstract of Towards Understanding Sycophancy in Language Models (arXiv:2310.13548, CC0)
2
System cards report it, from 1 lab

No scores here yet

No lab, leaderboard or Epoch AI run has reported a score for SycophancyEval (Sharma et al.) yet.

Labs report it only in system cards

We read the headline results of 522 launch posts from 52 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.

2 system cards report it, from 1 lab

Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.

DateDocumentScoreAs the document writes itSection
May 22, 2025 Claude Sonnet 4 system card Sycophancy assessments replicating Sharma et al., answer bias and feedback bias charts without printed values (Fig 4.1.5.1.A) Alignment
May 22, 2025 Claude Opus 4 system card Sycophancy assessments replicating Sharma et al., answer bias and feedback bias charts without printed values (Fig 4.1.5.1.A) Alignment

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