Benchmark Almanac

ToxiGen (discriminative)

Only in system cards

Models label statements about 13 minority groups as toxic or neutral. Scored by accuracy, often split into toxic and neutral labels.

Microsoft Phi reports run it through Eureka ML Insights. Other labs use ToxiGen prompts to measure toxic generations instead.

Released
March 2022
Kind
Bias, fairness and politics
Level
Everyday
Scored
Checked automatically
Answers
Multiple choice
Tasks
All public
Last in a system card
April 2025
Last model added
April 2025

In the authors’ words

Toxic language detection systems often falsely flag text that contains minority group mentions as toxic, as those groups are often the targets of online hate. Such over-reliance on spurious correlations also causes systems to struggle with detecting implicitly toxic language. To help mitigate these issues, we create ToxiGen, a new large-scale and machine-generated dataset of 274k toxic and benign statements about 13 minority groups. We develop a demonstration-based prompting framework and an adversarial classifier-in-the-loop decoding method to generate subtly toxic and benign text with a massive pretrained language model. Controlling machine generation in this way allows ToxiGen to cover implicitly toxic text at a larger scale, and about more demographic groups, than previous resources of human-written text. We conduct a human evaluation on a challenging subset of ToxiGen and find that annotators struggle to distinguish machine-generated text from human-written language. We also find that 94.5% of toxic examples are labeled as hate speech by human annotators. Using three publicly-available datasets, we show that finetuning a toxicity classifier on our data improves its performance on human-written data substantially. We also demonstrate that ToxiGen can be used to fight machine-generated toxicity as finetuning improves the classifier significantly on our evaluation subset. Our code and data can be found at https://github.com/microsoft/ToxiGen.

Abstract of ToxiGen: A Large-Scale Machine-Generated Dataset for Adversarial and Implicit Hate Speech Detection (arXiv:2203.09509, CC0)
2
Models scored in lab cards
2
System cards report it, from 1 lab

Phi-4-reasoning leads with 85.5%

Best score per model as labs report them in their own cards. Labs pick their own settings, so these compare less cleanly than independent runs.

  1. 1 Phi-4-reasoning 85.5%
  2. 2 Phi-4-Reasoning-plus 85%

Source: Labs’ model cards

#ModelScoreSettingDateSource
1 Phi-4-reasoning 85.5% Apr 2025 Lab model card
2 Phi-4-Reasoning-plus 85% Apr 2025 Lab model card

Microsoft’s own number for Phi-4-reasoning passed 85% in April 2025

All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.

Reported by the lab in its model card
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 2025 Near the ceiling (85%) Phi-4-reasoning 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 2025 Near the ceiling (85%) Phi-4-reasoning

Source: Labs’ model cards

Labs report it only in system cards

We read the headline results of 522 launch posts from 52 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.

2 system cards report it, from 1 lab

Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.

DateDocumentScoreAs the document writes itSection
Apr 30, 2025 Phi-4-reasoning technical report 85.5 Toxigen discriminative, aggregate accuracy (Figure 18a), Table 2 gives toxic 86.7 and neutral 84.7 Bias
Apr 30, 2025 Phi-4-Reasoning-plus technical report 85 Toxigen discriminative, aggregate accuracy (Figure 18a), Table 2 gives toxic 77.3 and neutral 90.5 Bias

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