Benchmark Almanac

UK AISI sabotage continuation evaluation

Claude Opus 4.7 0% leads since July 2026
Only in system cards

Agents resume trajectories where sabotage of safety research already began. Scored on the share of trajectories where they actively continue the sabotage.

Third-party UK AISI evaluation reported in OpenAI and Anthropic system cards.

Released
July 2026
Kind
Deception and alignment
Level
Expert
Scored
Graded by people
Answers
Agent task
Tasks
Kept private
Strongest model tested
Claude Opus 5 #10 on the capability index
Last in a system card
July 2026
Last model added
July 2026
4
Models scored in lab cards
4
System cards report it, from 2 labs

Claude Opus 4.7 leads with 0% among models released by July 2026

Best score per model as labs report them in their own cards. Labs pick their own settings, so these compare less cleanly than independent runs.

The newest model with a score here came out in July 2026, and nobody has reported a newer one. Among the 20 highest-ranked models on the capability index, these have no score yet:

  1. 1 Claude Opus 4.7 0%
  2. 2 Claude Opus 5 0.10%
  3. 3 Claude Opus 4.8 1.00%
  4. 4 GPT-5.6 Sol 1.00%

Source: Labs’ model cards

#ModelScoreSettingDateSource
1 Claude Opus 4.7 0% Apr 2026 Lab model card
2 Claude Opus 5 0.10% Jul 2026 Lab model card
3 Claude Opus 4.8 1.00% May 2026 Lab model card
4 GPT-5.6 Sol 1.00% Jul 2026 Lab model card

Number one over time

Lab claims count from the day the card came out, independent runs from the model’s release.

Anthropic
Lab claims Not tested since Jul 2026

Source: Labs’ model cards

Scores over time

All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.

Reported by the lab in its model card Best so far
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 2026 Claude Opus 5 Claude Opus 4.8 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 2026 Claude Opus 5

Source: Labs’ model cards

Labs report it only in system cards

We read the headline results of 522 launch posts from 52 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.

4 system cards report it, from 2 labs

Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.

DateDocumentScoreAs the document writes itSection
Jul 24, 2026 Claude Opus 5 system card 0.1 UK AISI continuation evaluation, actively continued compromising safety research in 2 of 1,482 samples (0.1%), reasoning-output discrepancy 1.6%, verbalized evaluation awareness 2.8%, lower is better (6.4.8) Alignment
Jul 9, 2026 GPT-5.6 Sol system card 1 UK AISI continuation evaluation, actively continued sabotage in approximately 1% of trajectories (9.2.1) Alignment
May 28, 2026 Claude Opus 4.8 system card 1 UK AISI sabotage continuation, early checkpoint, actively continued the sabotage attempt 1% of the time. Verbalized evaluation awareness 1.2%, real versus synthetic deployment data told apart at 79% accuracy, lower is better (6.2.4) Alignment
Apr 16, 2026 Claude Opus 4.7 system card 0 UK AISI continuation evaluation, actively continues compromising research 0% of the time. Unprompted evaluation awareness 3.4%, prompted eval-vs-deployment accuracy 62% (6.2.4) Alignment

More in Safety and alignment

All 465 in Safety and alignment
  • FORTRESS In use Paired adversarial and benign national-security misuse prompts. Rubric-graded risk score on adversarial and over-refusal score on benign prompts. Claude Opus 5.5 5.78%
  • StrongREJECT In use Forbidden-prompt jailbreak benchmark with a rubric grader that scores how useful a non-refusal actually is. Inkling 98.6%
  • Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts. Gemini 4 Carbon 0%
  • DistressBench In use Models reply as a chatbot to 718 simulated users in psychological crisis, in single-turn and multi-turn chats. Three judge models score replies against clinician-written rubrics. Muse Spark 1.2 88.4%
  • Lakera B3 (Backbone Breaker Benchmark) In use Crowdsourced prompt-injection attacks hit backbone LLMs inside agent threat snapshots at three defense levels. The score is attack resistance, 100 minus the board's vulnerability percentage. Claude Opus 4.5 89%
  • IHEval In use Models face conflicts between system, user and tool instructions. Reports a composite score for following the higher-priority instruction. GPT-4o 70%