Video-SafetyBench
Video-language models receive 2,264 synthesized videos paired with a harmful or a benign-looking query across 13 unsafe categories and 48 subcategories. An LLM judge scores harm with a confidence-weighted metric called RJScore.
Accepted to the NeurIPS 2025 Datasets and Benchmarks track. Benign queries look harmless but become harmful when read with the video.
- Made by
- BAAI FlagEval team
- Released
- May 2025
- Kind
- Jailbreaks and prompt injection
- Level
- Everyday
- Scored
- Graded by a model
- Answers
- Open-ended
- Tasks
- All public
- Strongest model tested
- Claude 3.7 Sonnet #118 on the capability index
- Last model added
- March 2025
- Scores refreshed
- November 12th, 2026
In the authors’ words
The increasing deployment of Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) raises safety concerns under potential malicious inputs. However, existing multimodal safety evaluations primarily focus on model vulnerabilities exposed by static image inputs, ignoring the temporal dynamics of video that may induce distinct safety risks. To bridge this gap, we introduce Video-SafetyBench, the first comprehensive benchmark designed to evaluate the safety of LVLMs under video-text attacks. It comprises 2,264 video-text pairs spanning 48 fine-grained unsafe categories, each pairing a synthesized video with either a harmful query, which contains explicit malice, or a benign query, which appears harmless but triggers harmful behavior when interpreted alongside the video. To generate semantically accurate videos for safety evaluation, we design a controllable pipeline that decomposes video semantics into subject images (what is shown) and motion text (how it moves), which jointly guide the synthesis of query-relevant videos. To effectively evaluate uncertain or borderline harmful outputs, we propose RJScore, a novel LLM-based metric that incorporates the confidence of judge models and human-aligned decision threshold calibration. Extensive experiments show that benign-query video composition achieves average attack success rates of 67.2%, revealing consistent vulnerabilities to video-induced attacks. We believe Video-SafetyBench will catalyze future research into video-based safety evaluation and defense strategies.
Claude 3.5 Sonnet (snapshot unspecified) tops the leaderboard with 1.20
Best score per entry from the benchmark's own leaderboard, read on November 12th, 2026. Where a model ran with several settings or harnesses, we keep its best. Every run is in the next chart. Names in gray aren't in our model list: fine-tunes, agent systems, products and older models. They don't count toward leaders. The best model we track is Claude 3.7 Sonnet, at 1.30.
The newest model with a score here came out in March 2025, and nobody has tested a newer one. Among the 20 highest-ranked models on the capability index, these have no score yet:
- Claude Fable 5.2
-
Gemini 4 Carbon
- GPT-6 Astra
- Claude Opus 5.5
- and 16 more
- 1 Claude 3.5 Sonnet (snapshot unspecified) harmful queries 1.20
- 2 Claude 3.7 Sonnet harmful queries 1.30
- 3 GPT-4o (snapshot unspecified) harmful queries 1.40
- 4 GPT-4o-mini (snapshot unspecified) harmful queries 1.50
- 5
Gemini 2.0 Pro harmful queries 1.70
- 6 Qwen-VL-Max harmful queries 1.80
- 7
InternVL2.5-8B harmful queries 1.90
- 8
InternVL2_5-78B harmful queries 1.90
- 9
Gemini 2.0 Flash Feb 2025, harmful queries 2.00
- 10
Qwen2.5-VL-32B harmful queries 2.00
- 11
InternVL2-8B harmful queries 2.10
- 12 InternVideo2.5-8B harmful queries 2.20
- 13 VideoLLAMA3-7B harmful queries 2.20
- 14
Qwen2.5-VL-7B harmful queries 2.20
- 15 Category Average harmful queries 2.30
- 16 Qwen2-VL-72B harmful queries 2.40
- 17
Qwen2.5-VL-72B harmful queries 2.40
- 18
LLaVA-OneVision 7B harmful queries 2.70
- 19 Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct harmful queries 2.70
- 20 VideoLLaMA2-72B harmful queries 3.00
- 21 Mistral-3.1-24B harmful queries 3.10
- 22 LLaVA-OneVision 72B harmful queries 3.10
- 23 MiniCPM-o-2_6 harmful queries 3.20
- 24 LLaVA-Video-72B harmful queries 3.30
- 25 LLaVA-Video-7B harmful queries 3.60
Source: Official Video-SafetyBench leaderboard
| # | Entry | Score | Setting | Date | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Claude 3.5 Sonnet (snapshot unspecified) | 1.20 | harmful queries | Official leaderboard | |
| 2 | Claude 3.7 Sonnet | 1.30 | harmful queries | Feb 2025 | Official leaderboard |
| 3 | GPT-4o (snapshot unspecified) | 1.40 | harmful queries | Official leaderboard | |
| 4 | GPT-4o-mini (snapshot unspecified) | 1.50 | harmful queries | Official leaderboard | |
| 5 | | 1.70 | harmful queries | Feb 2025 | Official leaderboard |
| 6 | Qwen-VL-Max | 1.80 | harmful queries | Jan 2024 | Official leaderboard |
| 7 | | 1.90 | harmful queries | Dec 2024 | Official leaderboard |
| 8 | | 1.90 | harmful queries | Dec 2024 | Official leaderboard |
| 9 | | 2.00 | harmful queries | Feb 2025 | Official leaderboard |
| 10 | | 2.00 | harmful queries | Mar 2025 | Official leaderboard |
| 11 | | 2.10 | harmful queries | Jul 2024 | Official leaderboard |
| 12 | InternVideo2.5-8B | 2.20 | harmful queries | Official leaderboard | |
| 13 | VideoLLAMA3-7B | 2.20 | harmful queries | Jan 2024 | Official leaderboard |
| 14 | | 2.20 | harmful queries | Jan 2025 | Official leaderboard |
| 15 | Category Average | 2.30 | harmful queries | Official leaderboard | |
| 16 | Qwen2-VL-72B | 2.40 | harmful queries | Official leaderboard | |
| 17 | | 2.40 | harmful queries | Jan 2025 | Official leaderboard |
| 18 | | 2.70 | harmful queries | Aug 2024 | Official leaderboard |
| 19 | Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct | 2.70 | harmful queries | Aug 2024 | Official leaderboard |
| 20 | VideoLLaMA2-72B | 3.00 | harmful queries | Official leaderboard | |
| 21 | Mistral-3.1-24B | 3.10 | harmful queries | Official leaderboard | |
| 22 | LLaVA-OneVision 72B | 3.10 | harmful queries | Aug 2024 | Official leaderboard |
| 23 | MiniCPM-o-2_6 | 3.20 | harmful queries | Jan 2025 | Official leaderboard |
| 24 | LLaVA-Video-72B | 3.30 | harmful queries | Official leaderboard | |
| 25 | LLaVA-Video-7B | 3.60 | harmful queries | Official leaderboard |
Scores at each effort level
Models the leaderboard ran at two or more effort levels. We don’t have enough cost data here to say what the extra effort costs.
Source: Official Video-SafetyBench leaderboard
| Model | Effort | Harness | Score | Cost per task | Output tokens |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MiniCPM-o-2_6 | benign-looking queries | 4.00 | |||
| | benign-looking queries | 3.80 | |||
| Qwen-VL-Max | benign-looking queries | 3.70 | |||
| LLaVA-OneVision 72B | benign-looking queries | 3.70 | |||
| Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct | benign-looking queries | 3.70 | |||
| | benign-looking queries | 3.60 | |||
| | benign-looking queries | 3.60 | |||
| | benign-looking queries | 3.50 | |||
| | benign-looking queries | 3.40 | |||
| | benign-looking queries | 3.30 | |||
| | benign-looking queries | 3.30 | |||
| VideoLLAMA3-7B | benign-looking queries | 3.20 | |||
| MiniCPM-o-2_6 | harmful queries | 3.20 | |||
| LLaVA-OneVision 72B | harmful queries | 3.10 | |||
| | benign-looking queries | 3.10 | |||
| | benign-looking queries | 3.10 | |||
| | harmful queries | 2.70 | |||
| Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct | harmful queries | 2.70 | |||
| | harmful queries | 2.40 | |||
| VideoLLAMA3-7B | harmful queries | 2.20 | |||
| | harmful queries | 2.20 | |||
| | harmful queries | 2.10 | |||
| | harmful queries | 2.00 | |||
| | harmful queries | 2.00 | |||
| | harmful queries | 1.90 | |||
| | harmful queries | 1.90 | |||
| Claude 3.7 Sonnet | benign-looking queries | 1.90 | |||
| Qwen-VL-Max | harmful queries | 1.80 | |||
| | harmful queries | 1.70 | |||
| Claude 3.7 Sonnet | harmful queries | 1.30 |
Number one over time
Lab claims count from the day the card came out, independent runs from the model’s release.
Source: Official Video-SafetyBench leaderboard
Scores over time
All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.
Source: Official Video-SafetyBench leaderboard
No lab model card reports it yet
We read the headline results of 522 launch posts from 52 labs, and none of them list this benchmark.
More in Safety and alignment
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Inkling 98.6%
- Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts.
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- Lakera B3 (Backbone Breaker Benchmark) In use Crowdsourced prompt-injection attacks hit backbone LLMs inside agent threat snapshots at three defense levels. The score is attack resistance, 100 minus the board's vulnerability percentage. Claude Opus 4.5 89%
- IHEval In use Models face conflicts between system, user and tool instructions. Reports a composite score for following the higher-priority instruction. GPT-4o 70%