Benchmark Almanac

WildChat toxic refusals (Anthropic)

Claude 3.5 Sonnet 96.4% leads since June 2024
Only in system cards

Models answer toxic user prompts drawn from the WildChat dataset of real chatbot conversations. Score is the correct refusal rate.

Anthropic refusal evaluation on the toxic subset of WildChat, first reported in the Claude 3 model card. The exact prompt selection is not public.

Made by
Anthropic
Released
March 2024
Kind
Refusing harmful requests
Level
Everyday
Scored
Graded by a model
Answers
Open-ended
Tasks
Kept private
Strongest model tested
Claude 3.5 Sonnet (October 2024) #149 on the capability index
Last in a system card
October 2024
Last model added
October 2024
3
Models scored in lab cards
6
System cards report it, from 1 lab

Claude 3.5 Sonnet leads with 96.4% among models released by October 2024

Best score per model as labs report them in their own cards. Labs pick their own settings, so these compare less cleanly than independent runs.

The newest model with a score here came out in October 2024, and nobody has reported a newer one. Among the 20 highest-ranked models on the capability index, these have no score yet:

  1. 1 Claude 3.5 Sonnet 96.4%
  2. 2 Claude 3.5 Sonnet (October 2024) 89.2%
  3. 3 Claude 3.5 Haiku 88%

Source: Labs’ model cards

#ModelScoreSettingDateSource
1 Claude 3.5 Sonnet 96.4% Jun 2024 Lab model card
2 Claude 3.5 Sonnet (October 2024) 89.2% Oct 2024 Lab model card
3 Claude 3.5 Haiku 88% Oct 2024 Lab model card

Number one over time

Lab claims count from the day the card came out, independent runs from the model’s release.

Anthropic
Lab claims Passed 85% in Jun 2024, by Claude 3.5 Sonnet

Source: Labs’ model cards

Anthropic’s own number for Claude 3.5 Sonnet passed 85% in June 2024

All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.

Reported by the lab in its model card
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 2024 2025 Near the ceiling (85%) Claude 3.5 Sonnet 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 2024 2025 Near the ceiling (85%) Claude 3.5 Sonnet

Source: Labs’ model cards

Labs report it only in system cards

We read the headline results of 522 launch posts from 52 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.

6 system cards report it, from 1 lab

Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.

DateDocumentScoreAs the document writes itSection
Oct 22, 2024 Claude 3.5 Sonnet (October 2024) model card 89.2 Wildchat Toxic, correct refusals, higher is better (Table 6) Safety
Oct 22, 2024 Claude 3.5 Haiku model card 88 Wildchat Toxic, correct refusals, higher is better (Table 6) Safety
Jun 20, 2024 Claude 3.5 Sonnet model card 96.4 Wildchat Toxic, correct refusals, higher is better (Table 4) Safety
Mar 4, 2024 Claude 3 Sonnet model card Correct refusals (Wildchat Toxic), refusal rate on harmful prompts, chart without printed values (Figure 2) Safety
Mar 4, 2024 Claude 3 Opus model card Correct refusals (Wildchat Toxic), refusal rate on harmful prompts, chart without printed values (Figure 2) Safety
Mar 4, 2024 Claude 3 Haiku model card Correct refusals (Wildchat Toxic), refusal rate on harmful prompts, chart without printed values (Figure 2) Safety

More in Safety and alignment

All 465 in Safety and alignment
  • FORTRESS In use Paired adversarial and benign national-security misuse prompts. Rubric-graded risk score on adversarial and over-refusal score on benign prompts. Claude Opus 5.5 5.78%
  • StrongREJECT In use Forbidden-prompt jailbreak benchmark with a rubric grader that scores how useful a non-refusal actually is. Inkling 98.6%
  • Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts. Gemini 4 Carbon 0%
  • DistressBench In use Models reply as a chatbot to 718 simulated users in psychological crisis, in single-turn and multi-turn chats. Three judge models score replies against clinician-written rubrics. Muse Spark 1.2 88.4%
  • Lakera B3 (Backbone Breaker Benchmark) In use Crowdsourced prompt-injection attacks hit backbone LLMs inside agent threat snapshots at three defense levels. The score is attack resistance, 100 minus the board's vulnerability percentage. Claude Opus 4.5 89%
  • IHEval In use Models face conflicts between system, user and tool instructions. Reports a composite score for following the higher-priority instruction. GPT-4o 70%