WildJailbreak
Models face adversarial jailbreak prompts built from in-the-wild tactics, plus benign prompts that look harmful. Evaluations score refusals of harmful requests and compliance with benign ones.
The release is mainly a 262K pair safety training set. Launch posts report its evaluation split.
- Released
- June 2024
- Kind
- Jailbreaks and prompt injection
- Level
- Everyday
- Scored
- Graded by a model
- Answers
- Open-ended
- Tasks
- All public
- Last in a launch post
- December 2025, dropped after it saturated
- Last model added
- January 2026
In the authors’ words
We introduce WildTeaming, an automatic LLM safety red-teaming framework that mines in-the-wild user-chatbot interactions to discover 5.7K unique clusters of novel jailbreak tactics, and then composes multiple tactics for systematic exploration of novel jailbreaks. Compared to prior work that performed red-teaming via recruited human workers, gradient-based optimization, or iterative revision with LLMs, our work investigates jailbreaks from chatbot users who were not specifically instructed to break the system. WildTeaming reveals previously unidentified vulnerabilities of frontier LLMs, resulting in up to 4.6x more diverse and successful adversarial attacks compared to state-of-the-art jailbreak methods. While many datasets exist for jailbreak evaluation, very few open-source datasets exist for jailbreak training, as safety training data has been closed even when model weights are open. With WildTeaming we create WildJailbreak, a large-scale open-source synthetic safety dataset with 262K vanilla (direct request) and adversarial (complex jailbreak) prompt-response pairs. To mitigate exaggerated safety behaviors, WildJailbreak provides two contrastive types of queries: 1) harmful queries (vanilla & adversarial) and 2) benign queries that resemble harmful queries in form but contain no harm. As WildJailbreak considerably upgrades the quality and scale of existing safety resources, it uniquely enables us to examine the scaling effects of data and the interplay of data properties and model capabilities during safety training. Through extensive experiments, we identify the training properties that enable an ideal balance of safety behaviors: appropriate safeguarding without over-refusal, effective handling of vanilla and adversarial queries, and minimal, if any, decrease in general capabilities. All components of WildJailbeak contribute to achieving balanced safety behaviors of models.
Falcon H1R 7B leads with 98.5%
Best score per model as labs report them in their own cards. Labs pick their own settings, so these compare less cleanly than independent runs.
- 1
Falcon H1R 7B 98.5%
- 2
K-EXAONE 89.9%
Source: Labs’ model cards
| # | Model | Score | Setting | Date | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | | 98.5% | Jan 2026 | Lab model card | |
| 2 | | 89.9% | Dec 2025 | Lab model card |
2 models have held number one in labs’ own numbers since its release in June 2024
Lab claims count from the day the card came out, independent runs from the model’s release.
Source: Labs’ model cards
LG AI Research’s own number for K-EXAONE passed 85% in December 2025
All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.
Source: Labs’ model cards
Labs headline it less often now, last in December 2025
Launch posts from every lab that has listed it, one tick per post. Tall colored ticks include it, and short gray ones leave it out.
| Date | Launch post | Score | As the post writes it |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dec 31, 2025 | 89.9 | Wild-Jailbreak |
4 system cards report it, from 3 labs
Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.
| Date | Document | Score | As the document writes it | Section |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jan 5, 2026 | | 98.5 | AllenAI Wildjailbreak safe rate, CoT+Answer, 98.31 Answer Only, 96.1 CoT Only (Table 10) | Robustness |
| Jan 5, 2026 | | 89.9 | WildJailbreak Safe Rate, Qwen3Guard judge (Table 3, Reasoning mode). Non-reasoning 91.6 (Table 4) | Safety |
| Dec 15, 2025 | | WildJailbreak-Test Harmful 25.6 and Benign 99.7, no overall, Final Think 3.0 column (Table 54) | Safety | |
| Dec 15, 2025 | | WildJailbreak-Test Harmful 71.7 and Benign 92.3, no overall, Final Think 3.1 column (Table 54) | Safety |
More in Safety and alignment
- FORTRESS In use Paired adversarial and benign national-security misuse prompts. Rubric-graded risk score on adversarial and over-refusal score on benign prompts. Claude Opus 5.5 5.78%
- StrongREJECT In use Forbidden-prompt jailbreak benchmark with a rubric grader that scores how useful a non-refusal actually is.
Inkling 98.6%
- Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts.
Gemini 4 Carbon 0%
- DistressBench In use Models reply as a chatbot to 718 simulated users in psychological crisis, in single-turn and multi-turn chats. Three judge models score replies against clinician-written rubrics.
Muse Spark 1.2 88.4%
- Lakera B3 (Backbone Breaker Benchmark) In use Crowdsourced prompt-injection attacks hit backbone LLMs inside agent threat snapshots at three defense levels. The score is attack resistance, 100 minus the board's vulnerability percentage. Claude Opus 4.5 89%
- IHEval In use Models face conflicts between system, user and tool instructions. Reports a composite score for following the higher-priority instruction. GPT-4o 70%