Benchmark Almanac

BrowseSafe-Bench

BrowseSafe 90.4% tops its leaderboard Claude Sonnet 4.5 86.3% leads the models we track
Not in model cards

Detectors and browser agents face prompt injections hidden in realistic HTML pages, across 11 attack types, nine placements and three writing styles. 3,680 test samples.

14,719 samples in all, 11,039 for training. Released with the BrowseSafe detection model.

Made by
Perplexity
Released
November 2025
Kind
Jailbreaks and prompt injection
Level
University
Scored
Checked automatically
Answers
Multiple choice
Tasks
All public
Strongest model tested
GPT-5 #70 on the capability index
Last model added
October 2025
Scores refreshed
November 12th, 2026

In the authors’ words

The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) agents into web browsers introduces security challenges that go beyond traditional web application threat models. Prior work has identified prompt injection as a new attack vector for web agents, yet the resulting impact within real-world environments remains insufficiently understood. In this work, we examine the landscape of prompt injection attacks and synthesize a benchmark of attacks embedded in realistic HTML payloads. Our benchmark goes beyond prior work by emphasizing injections that can influence real-world actions rather than mere text outputs, and by presenting attack payloads with complexity and distractor frequency similar to what real-world agents encounter. We leverage this benchmark to conduct a comprehensive empirical evaluation of existing defenses, assessing their effectiveness across a suite of frontier AI models. We propose a multi-layered defense strategy comprising both architectural and model-based defenses to protect against evolving prompt injection attacks. Our work offers a blueprint for designing practical, secure web agents through a defense-in-depth approach.

Abstract of BrowseSafe: Understanding and Preventing Prompt Injection Within AI Browser Agents (arXiv:2511.20597, CC0)
9
Entries on its own leaderboard, 4 models we track

BrowseSafe tops the leaderboard with 90.4%

Best score per entry from the benchmark's own leaderboard, read on November 12th, 2026. Where a model ran with several settings or harnesses, we keep its best. Every run is in the next chart. Names in gray aren't in our model list: fine-tunes, agent systems, products and older models. They don't count toward leaders. The best model we track is Claude Sonnet 4.5, at 86.3%.

The newest model with a score here came out in October 2025, and nobody has tested a newer one. Among the 20 highest-ranked models on the capability index, these have no score yet:

  1. 1 BrowseSafe 90.4%
  2. 2 Claude Sonnet 4.5 8K 86.3%
  3. 3 GPT-5 Medium 85.5%
  4. 4 GPT-5 mini Low 85.4%
  5. 5 Claude Haiku 4.5 No Thinking 81%
  6. 6 gpt-oss-safeguard-20B Medium 79.6%
  7. 7 gpt-oss-safeguard-120B Medium 74.1%
  8. 8 PromptGuard-2-86M 36%
  9. 9 PromptGuard-2-22M 35%

Source: Official BrowseSafe-Bench leaderboard

#EntryScoreSettingDateSource
1 BrowseSafe 90.4% Official leaderboard
2 Claude Sonnet 4.5 86.3% 8K Sep 2025 Official leaderboard
3 GPT-5 85.5% Medium Aug 2025 Official leaderboard
4 GPT-5 mini 85.4% Low Aug 2025 Official leaderboard
5 Claude Haiku 4.5 81% No Thinking Oct 2025 Official leaderboard
6 gpt-oss-safeguard-20B 79.6% Medium Official leaderboard
7 gpt-oss-safeguard-120B 74.1% Medium Official leaderboard
8 PromptGuard-2-86M 36% Official leaderboard
9 PromptGuard-2-22M 35% Official leaderboard

More effort adds a median 10 points

Models the leaderboard ran at two or more effort levels. We don’t have enough cost data here to say what the extra effort costs.

Lowest effort to highest, light to dark
Claude Sonnet 4.5
No Thinking 1K
86.3%
GPT-5
Minimal
85.5%
GPT-5 mini
Minimal Low
85.4%
Claude Haiku 4.5
No Thinking
81%

Source: Official BrowseSafe-Bench leaderboard

ModelEffortHarnessScoreCost per taskOutput tokens
Claude Sonnet 4.5 8K 86.3%
Claude Sonnet 4.5 32K 86.3%
Claude Sonnet 4.5 1K 86.2%
GPT-5 Medium 85.5%
GPT-5 Low 85.4%
GPT-5 mini Low 85.4%
GPT-5 mini Medium 85.3%
GPT-5 mini High 85.2%
GPT-5 Minimal 84.9%
GPT-5 High 84%
Claude Haiku 4.5 No Thinking 81%
Claude Haiku 4.5 1K 80.9%
Claude Haiku 4.5 32K 80.8%
Claude Sonnet 4.5 No Thinking 80.7%
Claude Haiku 4.5 8K 80.5%
GPT-5 mini Minimal 75%

Number one over time

Lab claims count from the day the card came out, independent runs from the model’s release.

Anthropic
Own leaderboard Passed 85% in Nov 2025, by Claude Sonnet 4.5

Source: Official BrowseSafe-Bench leaderboard

GPT-5 on the official leaderboard passed 85% in August 2025

All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.

On the benchmark’s own leaderboard Best so far
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Near the ceiling (85%) Claude Sonnet 4.5 GPT-5 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Near the ceiling (85%) Claude Sonnet 4.5

Source: Official BrowseSafe-Bench leaderboard

No lab model card reports it yet

We read the headline results of 522 launch posts from 52 labs, and none of them list this benchmark.

Versions

We switch the top row to each new version when it comes out. Open it for one row per version. An old version stays in play while people still test it, so whoever first takes it past 85% gets credit for closing it out.

Anthropic OpenAI
BrowseSafe++ Passed 85% in Oct 2026, by GPT-6 Astra
GPT-6 Astra 91.5%
BrowseSafe-Bench Passed 85% in Nov 2025, by Claude Sonnet 4.5
BrowseSafe++ Passed 85% in Oct 2026, by GPT-6 Astra
GPT-6 Astra 91.5%

Source: Official leaderboards

More in Safety and alignment

All 465 in Safety and alignment
  • FORTRESS In use Paired adversarial and benign national-security misuse prompts. Rubric-graded risk score on adversarial and over-refusal score on benign prompts. Claude Opus 5.5 5.78%
  • StrongREJECT In use Forbidden-prompt jailbreak benchmark with a rubric grader that scores how useful a non-refusal actually is. Inkling 98.6%
  • Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts. Gemini 4 Carbon 0%
  • DistressBench In use Models reply as a chatbot to 718 simulated users in psychological crisis, in single-turn and multi-turn chats. Three judge models score replies against clinician-written rubrics. Muse Spark 1.2 88.4%
  • Lakera B3 (Backbone Breaker Benchmark) In use Crowdsourced prompt-injection attacks hit backbone LLMs inside agent threat snapshots at three defense levels. The score is attack resistance, 100 minus the board's vulnerability percentage. Claude Opus 4.5 89%
  • IHEval In use Models face conflicts between system, user and tool instructions. Reports a composite score for following the higher-priority instruction. GPT-4o 70%