Benchmark Almanac

First-Person Fairness evaluation

ChatGPT agent 0.40% leads since July 2025
Only in system cards

Tests whether a user's name (a demographic proxy) changes responses, using an LLM research assistant to detect harmful stereotypes.

Paper is public. The evaluation set is internal to OpenAI.

Made by
OpenAI
Released
October 2024
Kind
Bias, fairness and politics
Scored
Graded by a model
Answers
Open-ended
Tasks
Kept private
Strongest model tested
GPT-5.6 Sol #13 on the capability index
Last in a system card
July 2026
Last model added
July 2026

In the authors’ words

Evaluating chatbot fairness is crucial given their rapid proliferation, yet typical chatbot tasks (e.g., resume writing, entertainment) diverge from the institutional decision-making tasks (e.g., resume screening) which have traditionally been central to discussion of algorithmic fairness. The open-ended nature and diverse use-cases of chatbots necessitate novel methods for bias assessment. This paper addresses these challenges by introducing a scalable counterfactual approach to evaluate "first-person fairness," meaning fairness toward chatbot users based on demographic characteristics. Our method employs a Language Model as a Research Assistant (LMRA) to yield quantitative measures of harmful stereotypes and qualitative analyses of demographic differences in chatbot responses. We apply this approach to assess biases in six of our language models across millions of interactions, covering sixty-six tasks in nine domains and spanning two genders and four races. Independent human annotations corroborate the LMRA-generated bias evaluations. This study represents the first large-scale fairness evaluation based on real-world chat data. We highlight that post-training reinforcement learning techniques significantly mitigate these biases. This evaluation provides a practical methodology for ongoing bias monitoring and mitigation.

Abstract of First-Person Fairness in Chatbots (arXiv:2410.19803, CC0)
10
Models scored in lab cards
13
System cards report it, from 1 lab

ChatGPT agent leads with 0.40% among models released by July 2026

Best score per model as labs report them in their own cards. Labs pick their own settings, so these compare less cleanly than independent runs.

The newest model with a score here came out in July 2026, and nobody has reported a newer one. Among the 20 highest-ranked models on the capability index, these have no score yet:

  1. 1 ChatGPT agent 0.40%
  2. 2 o3 0.60%
  3. 3 GPT-5.6 Luna 0.61%
  4. 4 o4-mini 0.70%
  5. 5 GPT-5.4 0.88%
  6. 6 GPT-5.6 Terra 0.88%
  7. 7 GPT-5.6 Sol 0.98%
  8. 8 GPT-5.2 1.00%
  9. 9 GPT-5.5 Instant 1.01%
  10. 10 GPT-5.5 1.12%

Source: Labs’ model cards

#ModelScoreSettingDateSource
1 ChatGPT agent 0.40% Jul 2025 Lab model card
2 o3 0.60% Apr 2025 Lab model card
3 GPT-5.6 Luna 0.61% Jun 2026 Lab model card
4 o4-mini 0.70% Apr 2025 Lab model card
5 GPT-5.4 0.88% Mar 2026 Lab model card
6 GPT-5.6 Terra 0.88% Jun 2026 Lab model card
7 GPT-5.6 Sol 0.98% Jun 2026 Lab model card
8 GPT-5.2 1.00% Dec 2025 Lab model card
9 GPT-5.5 Instant 1.01% May 2026 Lab model card
10 GPT-5.5 1.12% Apr 2026 Lab model card

2 models have held number one in labs’ own numbers since its release in October 2024

Lab claims count from the day the card came out, independent runs from the model’s release.

OpenAI
Lab claims Not tested since Jul 2026

Source: Labs’ model cards

Scores over time

All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.

Reported by the lab in its model card Best so far
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 2025 2026 ChatGPT agent 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 2025 2026 ChatGPT agent

Source: Labs’ model cards

Labs report it only in system cards

We read the headline results of 522 launch posts from 52 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.

13 system cards report it, from 1 lab

Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.

DateDocumentScoreAs the document writes itSection
Jul 9, 2026 GPT-5.6 Terra system card 0.88 First-Person Fairness Evaluation, harm_overall, lower is better, printed chart label (Figure 21, 8.1) Bias
Jul 9, 2026 GPT-5.6 Sol system card 0.98 First-Person Fairness Evaluation, harm_overall, lower is better, printed chart label (Figure 21, 8.1) Bias
Jul 9, 2026 GPT-5.6 Luna system card 0.61 First-Person Fairness Evaluation, harm_overall, lower is better, printed chart label (Figure 21, 8.1) Bias
Jun 25, 2026 GPT-5.6 Terra system card 0.88 First-Person Fairness Evaluation, harm_overall, lower is better, printed chart label (Figure 21, 8.1) Bias
Jun 25, 2026 GPT-5.6 Sol system card 0.98 First-Person Fairness Evaluation, harm_overall, lower is better, printed chart label (Figure 21, 8.1) Bias
Jun 25, 2026 GPT-5.6 Luna system card 0.61 First-Person Fairness Evaluation, harm_overall, lower is better, printed chart label (Figure 21, 8.1) Bias
May 4, 2026 GPT-5.5 Instant system card 1.01 First-person fairness evaluation, harm_overall 0.0101, lower is better (Table 6) (fraction converted to percent) Bias
Apr 23, 2026 GPT-5.5 system card 1.12 First-person fairness evaluation, harm_overall, lower is better (Table 9) (fraction converted to percent) Bias
Mar 5, 2026 GPT-5.4 system card 0.88 First-person fairness evaluation, harm_overall, lower is better (Table 10) (fraction converted to percent) Bias
Dec 11, 2025 GPT-5.2 system card addendum 0.997 First-person fairness evaluation, harm_overall 0.00997, gpt-5.2-thinking, lower is better (Table 9) Bias
Jul 17, 2025 ChatGPT agent system card 0.4 First-person fairness, net_bias 0.004 without tools, 0.003 with tools, lower is better (Table 8) Bias
Apr 16, 2025 o4-mini system card 0.7 First-person fairness evaluation, net_bias 0.007 (Table 8) Bias
Apr 16, 2025 o3 system card 0.6 First-person fairness evaluation, net_bias 0.006 (Table 8) Bias

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