Instruction Hierarchy Evaluation
Models resolve conflicts between system, developer and user messages, resist tutor jailbreaks, and protect secret phrases and passwords. Scored per sub-evaluation.
In-house OpenAI evaluation. Cards report sub-evaluations with no overall number.
- Made by
- OpenAI
- Released
- December 2024
- Kind
- Jailbreaks and prompt injection
- Level
- Everyday
- Scored
- Checked automatically
- Answers
- Open-ended
- Tasks
- Kept private
- Last in a system card
- August 2025
- Last model added
- August 2025
In the authors’ words
Today's LLMs are susceptible to prompt injections, jailbreaks, and other attacks that allow adversaries to overwrite a model's original instructions with their own malicious prompts. In this work, we argue that one of the primary vulnerabilities underlying these attacks is that LLMs often consider system prompts (e.g., text from an application developer) to be the same priority as text from untrusted users and third parties. To address this, we propose an instruction hierarchy that explicitly defines how models should behave when instructions of different priorities conflict. We then propose a data generation method to demonstrate this hierarchical instruction following behavior, which teaches LLMs to selectively ignore lower-privileged instructions. We apply this method to GPT-3.5, showing that it drastically increases robustness – even for attack types not seen during training – while imposing minimal degradations on standard capabilities.
No scores here yet
No lab, leaderboard or Epoch AI run has reported a score for Instruction Hierarchy Evaluation yet.
Labs report it only in system cards
We read the headline results of 522 launch posts from 52 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.
9 system cards report it, from 1 lab
Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.
| Date | Document | Score | As the document writes it | Section |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aug 7, 2025 | GPT-5 system card | Instruction Hierarchy Evaluations, 3 system prompt extraction and 2 phrase protection rows, no overall score (Table 6) | Robustness | |
| Aug 5, 2025 | gpt-oss-20b model card | Instruction Hierarchy Evaluation, system and user conflict plus phrase and password protection, 6 rows, no overall score (Tables 7, 8) | Robustness | |
| Aug 5, 2025 | gpt-oss-120b model card | Instruction Hierarchy Evaluation, system and user conflict plus phrase and password protection, 6 rows, no overall score (Tables 7, 8) | Robustness | |
| Jul 17, 2025 | ChatGPT agent system card | Instruction Hierarchy Evaluation, system prompt extraction 0.976, prompt injection hijacking 0.892, phrase protection 0.958, password protection 0.965, no overall score (Tables 9, 10) | Robustness | |
| Apr 16, 2025 | o4-mini system card | Instruction Hierarchy Evaluation, 9 sub-evaluations on message conflicts, tutor jailbreaks and phrase and password protection, no overall score (Tables 9 to 11) | Robustness | |
| Apr 16, 2025 | o3 system card | Instruction Hierarchy Evaluation, 9 sub-evaluations on message conflicts, tutor jailbreaks and phrase and password protection, no overall score (Tables 9 to 11) | Robustness | |
| Feb 27, 2025 | GPT-4.5 system card | Instruction Hierarchy Evaluation, 4 sub-evaluations on system and user conflicts, tutor jailbreak and phrase and password protection, no overall score (Tables 6 to 8) | Robustness | |
| Jan 31, 2025 | o3-mini system card | Instruction Hierarchy Evaluation, 9 sub-evaluations on message conflicts, tutor jailbreaks and phrase and password protection, no overall score (Tables 5 to 7) | Robustness | |
| Dec 5, 2024 | o1 system card | Instruction Hierarchy Evaluation, 9 sub-evaluations on message conflicts, tutor jailbreaks and phrase and password protection, no overall score (Tables 5 to 7) | Robustness |
More in Safety and alignment
- FORTRESS In use Paired adversarial and benign national-security misuse prompts. Rubric-graded risk score on adversarial and over-refusal score on benign prompts. Claude Opus 5.5 5.78%
- StrongREJECT In use Forbidden-prompt jailbreak benchmark with a rubric grader that scores how useful a non-refusal actually is.
Inkling 98.6%
- Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts.
Gemini 4 Carbon 0%
- DistressBench In use Models reply as a chatbot to 718 simulated users in psychological crisis, in single-turn and multi-turn chats. Three judge models score replies against clinician-written rubrics.
Muse Spark 1.2 88.4%
- Lakera B3 (Backbone Breaker Benchmark) In use Crowdsourced prompt-injection attacks hit backbone LLMs inside agent threat snapshots at three defense levels. The score is attack resistance, 100 minus the board's vulnerability percentage. Claude Opus 4.5 89%
- IHEval In use Models face conflicts between system, user and tool instructions. Reports a composite score for following the higher-priority instruction. GPT-4o 70%