Benchmark Almanac

Instruction Hierarchy Evaluation

Only in system cards

Models resolve conflicts between system, developer and user messages, resist tutor jailbreaks, and protect secret phrases and passwords. Scored per sub-evaluation.

In-house OpenAI evaluation. Cards report sub-evaluations with no overall number.

Made by
OpenAI
Released
December 2024
Kind
Jailbreaks and prompt injection
Level
Everyday
Scored
Checked automatically
Answers
Open-ended
Tasks
Kept private
Last in a system card
August 2025
Last model added
August 2025

In the authors’ words

Today's LLMs are susceptible to prompt injections, jailbreaks, and other attacks that allow adversaries to overwrite a model's original instructions with their own malicious prompts. In this work, we argue that one of the primary vulnerabilities underlying these attacks is that LLMs often consider system prompts (e.g., text from an application developer) to be the same priority as text from untrusted users and third parties. To address this, we propose an instruction hierarchy that explicitly defines how models should behave when instructions of different priorities conflict. We then propose a data generation method to demonstrate this hierarchical instruction following behavior, which teaches LLMs to selectively ignore lower-privileged instructions. We apply this method to GPT-3.5, showing that it drastically increases robustness – even for attack types not seen during training – while imposing minimal degradations on standard capabilities.

Abstract of The Instruction Hierarchy: Training LLMs to Prioritize Privileged Instructions (arXiv:2404.13208, CC0)
9
System cards report it, from 1 lab

No scores here yet

No lab, leaderboard or Epoch AI run has reported a score for Instruction Hierarchy Evaluation yet.

Labs report it only in system cards

We read the headline results of 522 launch posts from 52 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.

9 system cards report it, from 1 lab

Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.

DateDocumentScoreAs the document writes itSection
Aug 7, 2025 GPT-5 system card Instruction Hierarchy Evaluations, 3 system prompt extraction and 2 phrase protection rows, no overall score (Table 6) Robustness
Aug 5, 2025 gpt-oss-20b model card Instruction Hierarchy Evaluation, system and user conflict plus phrase and password protection, 6 rows, no overall score (Tables 7, 8) Robustness
Aug 5, 2025 gpt-oss-120b model card Instruction Hierarchy Evaluation, system and user conflict plus phrase and password protection, 6 rows, no overall score (Tables 7, 8) Robustness
Jul 17, 2025 ChatGPT agent system card Instruction Hierarchy Evaluation, system prompt extraction 0.976, prompt injection hijacking 0.892, phrase protection 0.958, password protection 0.965, no overall score (Tables 9, 10) Robustness
Apr 16, 2025 o4-mini system card Instruction Hierarchy Evaluation, 9 sub-evaluations on message conflicts, tutor jailbreaks and phrase and password protection, no overall score (Tables 9 to 11) Robustness
Apr 16, 2025 o3 system card Instruction Hierarchy Evaluation, 9 sub-evaluations on message conflicts, tutor jailbreaks and phrase and password protection, no overall score (Tables 9 to 11) Robustness
Feb 27, 2025 GPT-4.5 system card Instruction Hierarchy Evaluation, 4 sub-evaluations on system and user conflicts, tutor jailbreak and phrase and password protection, no overall score (Tables 6 to 8) Robustness
Jan 31, 2025 o3-mini system card Instruction Hierarchy Evaluation, 9 sub-evaluations on message conflicts, tutor jailbreaks and phrase and password protection, no overall score (Tables 5 to 7) Robustness
Dec 5, 2024 o1 system card Instruction Hierarchy Evaluation, 9 sub-evaluations on message conflicts, tutor jailbreaks and phrase and password protection, no overall score (Tables 5 to 7) Robustness

More in Safety and alignment

All 465 in Safety and alignment
  • FORTRESS In use Paired adversarial and benign national-security misuse prompts. Rubric-graded risk score on adversarial and over-refusal score on benign prompts. Claude Opus 5.5 5.78%
  • StrongREJECT In use Forbidden-prompt jailbreak benchmark with a rubric grader that scores how useful a non-refusal actually is. Inkling 98.6%
  • Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts. Gemini 4 Carbon 0%
  • DistressBench In use Models reply as a chatbot to 718 simulated users in psychological crisis, in single-turn and multi-turn chats. Three judge models score replies against clinician-written rubrics. Muse Spark 1.2 88.4%
  • Lakera B3 (Backbone Breaker Benchmark) In use Crowdsourced prompt-injection attacks hit backbone LLMs inside agent threat snapshots at three defense levels. The score is attack resistance, 100 minus the board's vulnerability percentage. Claude Opus 4.5 89%
  • IHEval In use Models face conflicts between system, user and tool instructions. Reports a composite score for following the higher-priority instruction. GPT-4o 70%