Irrelevant instructions, visual browser
Agents using a visual browser meet irrelevant instructions or data exfiltration attempts on web pages, based on red teaming scenarios. Scored on ignoring them.
In-house OpenAI evaluation. The tasks are not public. The ChatGPT Agent card also gives Operator scores on it.
- Made by
- OpenAI
- Released
- July 2025
- Kind
- Jailbreaks and prompt injection
- Level
- Expert
- Scored
- Graded by a model
- Answers
- Agent task
- Tasks
- Kept private
- Last in a system card
- July 2025
- Last model added
- July 2025
ChatGPT agent leads with 95%
Best score per model as labs report them in their own cards. Labs pick their own settings, so these compare less cleanly than independent runs.
Source: Labs’ model cards
| # | Model | Score | Setting | Date | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | ChatGPT agent | 95% | Jul 2025 | Lab model card |
OpenAI’s own number for ChatGPT agent passed 85% in July 2025
All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.
Source: Labs’ model cards
Labs report it only in system cards
We read the headline results of 522 launch posts from 52 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.
One system card reports it
Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.
| Date | Document | Score | As the document writes it | Section |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jul 17, 2025 | ChatGPT agent system card | 95 | Irrelevant instructions - visual browser (Table 12) | Robustness |
More in Safety and alignment
- FORTRESS In use Paired adversarial and benign national-security misuse prompts. Rubric-graded risk score on adversarial and over-refusal score on benign prompts. Claude Opus 5.5 5.78%
- StrongREJECT In use Forbidden-prompt jailbreak benchmark with a rubric grader that scores how useful a non-refusal actually is.
Inkling 98.6% - Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts.
Gemini 4 Carbon 0% - DistressBench In use Models reply as a chatbot to 718 simulated users in psychological crisis, in single-turn and multi-turn chats. Three judge models score replies against clinician-written rubrics.
Muse Spark 1.2 88.4% - Lakera B3 (Backbone Breaker Benchmark) In use Crowdsourced prompt-injection attacks hit backbone LLMs inside agent threat snapshots at three defense levels. The score is attack resistance, 100 minus the board's vulnerability percentage. Claude Opus 4.5 89%
- IHEval In use Models face conflicts between system, user and tool instructions. Reports a composite score for following the higher-priority instruction. GPT-4o 70%