Malicious agentic influence campaigns (Anthropic)
Agents receive requests to run multi-step influence operations with tools. Score is the refusal rate.
In-house Anthropic evaluation. The tasks are not public.
- Made by
- Anthropic
- Released
- April 2026
- Kind
- Refusing harmful requests
- Level
- Everyday
- Scored
- Graded by a model
- Answers
- Agent task
- Tasks
- Kept private
- Last in a system card
- September 2026
- Last model added
- September 2026
8
System cards report it, from 1 lab
No scores here yet
No lab, leaderboard or Epoch AI run has reported a score for Malicious agentic influence campaigns (Anthropic) yet.
Labs report it only in system cards
We read the headline results of 522 launch posts from 52 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.
8 system cards report it, from 1 lab
Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.
| Date | Document | Score | As the document writes it | Section |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sep 22, 2026 | Claude Opus 5.5 system card | Agentic influence operation evaluation, helpful-only variant, median campaign execution score out of 32 at the highest difficulty: voter suppression 27.5, domestic polarization 28, no overall (Table 5.1.3.A) | Persuasion | |
| Sep 1, 2026 | Claude Fable 5.1 system card | Agentic influence operation evaluation, helpful-only variant, median campaign execution score out of 32 at the highest difficulty: voter suppression 29.5, domestic polarization 28.5, no overall (Table 5.1.3.A) | Persuasion | |
| Jul 24, 2026 | Claude Opus 5 system card | Agentic influence operation evaluation (updated), helpful-only variant, median campaign execution score out of 32 at the highest difficulty over 8 attempts: voter suppression 23.5, domestic polarization 26.0, no overall (Table 5.1.3.A) | Persuasion | |
| Jun 30, 2026 | Claude Sonnet 5 system card | Agentic influence operation evaluation, helpful-only variant, task completion rate out of 70 criteria: voter suppression 50.8%, domestic polarization 43.3%, no overall (Table 5.1.3.A) | Persuasion | |
| Jun 9, 2026 | Claude Fable 5 system card | Agentic influence operation evaluation, helpful-only Mythos 5 variant, average share of 70 success criteria completed: voter suppression 67.1%, domestic polarization 46.8%, no overall (Table 5.1.3.A) | Persuasion | |
| May 28, 2026 | Claude Opus 4.8 system card | Agentic influence operation evaluation, helpful-only variant, average share of 70 success criteria completed, no overall: voter suppression 73.3%, domestic polarization 55.1% (Table 5.1.3.A) | Persuasion | |
| Apr 16, 2026 | Claude Opus 4.7 system card | Agentic influence operation evaluation, helpful-only model, average task completion rate out of 70 criteria, no overall: voter suppression 57.1, domestic polarization 46.8. Final model near 0% (Table 5.1.3.A) | Persuasion | |
| Apr 7, 2026 | Claude Mythos Preview system card | Malicious agentic influence campaigns, helpful-only model task completion rate (share of 70 success criteria), voter suppression 59.5 and domestic polarization 42.1, no overall. Text says the released model completed near 0% because it refused (Table 8.3.1.3.A) | Safety |
Versions
More in Safety and alignment
- FORTRESS In use Paired adversarial and benign national-security misuse prompts. Rubric-graded risk score on adversarial and over-refusal score on benign prompts. Claude Opus 5.5 5.78%
- StrongREJECT In use Forbidden-prompt jailbreak benchmark with a rubric grader that scores how useful a non-refusal actually is.
Inkling 98.6% - Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts.
Gemini 4 Carbon 0% - DistressBench In use Models reply as a chatbot to 718 simulated users in psychological crisis, in single-turn and multi-turn chats. Three judge models score replies against clinician-written rubrics.
Muse Spark 1.2 88.4% - Lakera B3 (Backbone Breaker Benchmark) In use Crowdsourced prompt-injection attacks hit backbone LLMs inside agent threat snapshots at three defense levels. The score is attack resistance, 100 minus the board's vulnerability percentage. Claude Opus 4.5 89%
- IHEval In use Models face conflicts between system, user and tool instructions. Reports a composite score for following the higher-priority instruction. GPT-4o 70%