External red team jailbreaks
External red teamers and automated gap finding generate jailbreaks against the model. Scored on how often the model resists.
Results from external red teaming, not a fixed benchmark.
- Made by
- OpenAI
- Released
- September 2024
- Kind
- Jailbreaks and prompt injection
- Level
- Expert
- Scored
- Graded by people
- Answers
- Open-ended
- Tasks
- Kept private
- Strongest model tested
- o1-mini #140 on the capability index
- Last in a system card
- September 2024
- Last model added
- September 2024
o1-preview leads with 44%
Best score per model as labs report them in their own cards. Labs pick their own settings, so these compare less cleanly than independent runs.
- 1 o1-preview 44%
- 2 o1-mini 15%
Source: Labs’ model cards
| # | Model | Score | Setting | Date | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | o1-preview | 44% | Sep 2024 | Lab model card | |
| 2 | o1-mini | 15% | Sep 2024 | Lab model card |
Scores over time
All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.
Source: Labs’ model cards
Labs report it only in system cards
We read the headline results of 522 launch posts from 52 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.
2 system cards report it, from 1 lab
Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.
| Date | Document | Score | As the document writes it | Section |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sep 12, 2024 | o1-preview system card | 44 | External red teaming, resisted automated iterative gap finding jailbreaks (3.3), human red team jailbreaks by content area in Figure 2 have no printed numbers | Robustness |
| Sep 12, 2024 | o1-mini system card | 15 | External red teaming, resisted automated iterative gap finding jailbreaks (3.3), human red team jailbreaks by content area in Figure 2 have no printed numbers | Robustness |
More in Safety and alignment
- FORTRESS In use Paired adversarial and benign national-security misuse prompts. Rubric-graded risk score on adversarial and over-refusal score on benign prompts. Claude Opus 5.5 5.78%
- StrongREJECT In use Forbidden-prompt jailbreak benchmark with a rubric grader that scores how useful a non-refusal actually is.
Inkling 98.6% - Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts.
Gemini 4 Carbon 0% - DistressBench In use Models reply as a chatbot to 718 simulated users in psychological crisis, in single-turn and multi-turn chats. Three judge models score replies against clinician-written rubrics.
Muse Spark 1.2 88.4% - Lakera B3 (Backbone Breaker Benchmark) In use Crowdsourced prompt-injection attacks hit backbone LLMs inside agent threat snapshots at three defense levels. The score is attack resistance, 100 minus the board's vulnerability percentage. Claude Opus 4.5 89%
- IHEval In use Models face conflicts between system, user and tool instructions. Reports a composite score for following the higher-priority instruction. GPT-4o 70%