ToxiGen
Models continue ToxiGen prompts about 13 minority groups. Scored by the average toxicity of the generations.
Generation use of ToxiGen. The classification use is toxigen-discriminative.
- Made by
- Microsoft Research + MIT (Hartvigsen et al.)
- Released
- March 2022
- Kind
- Bias, fairness and politics
- Level
- Everyday
- Scored
- Graded by a model
- Answers
- Open-ended
- Tasks
- All public
- Strongest model tested
-
Gemma 2 27B #189 on the capability index
- Last in a system card
- December 2025
- Last model added
- December 2025
In the authors’ words
Toxic language detection systems often falsely flag text that contains minority group mentions as toxic, as those groups are often the targets of online hate. Such over-reliance on spurious correlations also causes systems to struggle with detecting implicitly toxic language. To help mitigate these issues, we create ToxiGen, a new large-scale and machine-generated dataset of 274k toxic and benign statements about 13 minority groups. We develop a demonstration-based prompting framework and an adversarial classifier-in-the-loop decoding method to generate subtly toxic and benign text with a massive pretrained language model. Controlling machine generation in this way allows ToxiGen to cover implicitly toxic text at a larger scale, and about more demographic groups, than previous resources of human-written text. We conduct a human evaluation on a challenging subset of ToxiGen and find that annotators struggle to distinguish machine-generated text from human-written language. We also find that 94.5% of toxic examples are labeled as hate speech by human annotators. Using three publicly-available datasets, we show that finetuning a toxicity classifier on our data improves its performance on human-written data substantially. We also demonstrate that ToxiGen can be used to fight machine-generated toxicity as finetuning improves the classifier significantly on our evaluation subset. Our code and data can be found at https://github.com/microsoft/ToxiGen.
Gemma 2B leads with 29.8 among models released by June 2024
Best score per model as labs report them in their own cards. Labs pick their own settings, so these compare less cleanly than independent runs.
The newest model with a score here came out in June 2024, and nobody has reported a newer one. Among the 20 highest-ranked models on the capability index, these have no score yet:
- Claude Fable 5.2
-
Gemini 4 Carbon
- GPT-6 Astra
- Claude Opus 5.5
- and 16 more
- 1
Gemma 2B 29.8
- 2
Gemma 2 27B 38.4
- 3
Gemma 2 9B 39.3
- 4
Gemma 7B 39.6
Source: Labs’ model cards
| # | Model | Score | Setting | Date | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | | 29.8 | Mar 2024 | Lab model card | |
| 2 | | 38.4 | Jul 2024 | Lab model card | |
| 3 | | 39.3 | Jul 2024 | Lab model card | |
| 4 | | 39.6 | Mar 2024 | Lab model card |
Number one over time
Lab claims count from the day the card came out, independent runs from the model’s release.
Source: Labs’ model cards
Scores over time
All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.
Source: Labs’ model cards
Labs report it only in system cards
We read the headline results of 522 launch posts from 52 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.
14 system cards report it, from 4 labs
Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.
| Date | Document | Score | As the document writes it | Section |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dec 15, 2025 | | 100 | Toxigen, Final Think 3.0 column (Table 54) | Safety |
| Dec 15, 2025 | | 100 | Toxigen, Final Think 3.1 column (Table 54) | Safety |
| Sep 17, 2025 | | 70.3 | ToxiGen classification accuracy, higher is better (Table 26) | Bias |
| Jul 31, 2024 | | 39.3 | Toxigen, avg tox (lower is better), IT (Table 18) | Safety |
| Jul 31, 2024 | | 38.4 | Toxigen, avg tox (lower is better), IT (Table 18) | Safety |
| Mar 13, 2024 | | 39.6 | Toxigen (lower is better), IT (Table 8) | Safety |
| Mar 13, 2024 | | 29.8 | Toxigen (lower is better), IT (Table 8) | Safety |
| Jul 19, 2023 | | 21.3 | ToxiGen, % toxic generations (lower is better), pretrained (Table 11). Llama 2-Chat = 0.00 (Table 14) | Safety |
| Jul 19, 2023 | | 24.6 | ToxiGen, % toxic generations (lower is better), pretrained (Table 11). Llama 2-Chat = 0.01 (Table 14) | Safety |
| Jul 19, 2023 | | 21.2 | ToxiGen, % toxic generations (lower is better), pretrained (Table 11). Llama 2-Chat = 0.02 (Table 14) | Safety |
| Jul 19, 2023 | | 26.1 | ToxiGen, % toxic generations (lower is better), pretrained (Table 11). Llama 2-Chat = 0.00 (Table 14) | Safety |
| Jul 18, 2023 | | 21.3 | Toxigen, % toxic generations (lower is better), pretrained (automatic safety benchmarks table). Llama-2-Chat = 0.00 | Safety |
| Jul 18, 2023 | | 24.6 | Toxigen, % toxic generations (lower is better), pretrained (automatic safety benchmarks table). Llama-2-Chat = 0.01 | Safety |
| Jul 18, 2023 | | 26.1 | Toxigen, % toxic generations (lower is better), pretrained (automatic safety benchmarks table). Llama-2-Chat = 0.00 | Safety |
More in Safety and alignment
- FORTRESS In use Paired adversarial and benign national-security misuse prompts. Rubric-graded risk score on adversarial and over-refusal score on benign prompts. Claude Opus 5.5 5.78%
- StrongREJECT In use Forbidden-prompt jailbreak benchmark with a rubric grader that scores how useful a non-refusal actually is.
Inkling 98.6%
- Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts.
Gemini 4 Carbon 0%
- DistressBench In use Models reply as a chatbot to 718 simulated users in psychological crisis, in single-turn and multi-turn chats. Three judge models score replies against clinician-written rubrics.
Muse Spark 1.2 88.4%
- Lakera B3 (Backbone Breaker Benchmark) In use Crowdsourced prompt-injection attacks hit backbone LLMs inside agent threat snapshots at three defense levels. The score is attack resistance, 100 minus the board's vulnerability percentage. Claude Opus 4.5 89%
- IHEval In use Models face conflicts between system, user and tool instructions. Reports a composite score for following the higher-priority instruction. GPT-4o 70%