Benchmark Almanac

ToxiGen

Gemma 2B 29.8 leads since March 2024
Only in system cards

Models continue ToxiGen prompts about 13 minority groups. Scored by the average toxicity of the generations.

Generation use of ToxiGen. The classification use is toxigen-discriminative.

Released
March 2022
Kind
Bias, fairness and politics
Level
Everyday
Scored
Graded by a model
Answers
Open-ended
Tasks
All public
Strongest model tested
Gemma 2 27B #189 on the capability index
Last in a system card
December 2025
Last model added
December 2025

In the authors’ words

Toxic language detection systems often falsely flag text that contains minority group mentions as toxic, as those groups are often the targets of online hate. Such over-reliance on spurious correlations also causes systems to struggle with detecting implicitly toxic language. To help mitigate these issues, we create ToxiGen, a new large-scale and machine-generated dataset of 274k toxic and benign statements about 13 minority groups. We develop a demonstration-based prompting framework and an adversarial classifier-in-the-loop decoding method to generate subtly toxic and benign text with a massive pretrained language model. Controlling machine generation in this way allows ToxiGen to cover implicitly toxic text at a larger scale, and about more demographic groups, than previous resources of human-written text. We conduct a human evaluation on a challenging subset of ToxiGen and find that annotators struggle to distinguish machine-generated text from human-written language. We also find that 94.5% of toxic examples are labeled as hate speech by human annotators. Using three publicly-available datasets, we show that finetuning a toxicity classifier on our data improves its performance on human-written data substantially. We also demonstrate that ToxiGen can be used to fight machine-generated toxicity as finetuning improves the classifier significantly on our evaluation subset. Our code and data can be found at https://github.com/microsoft/ToxiGen.

Abstract of ToxiGen: A Large-Scale Machine-Generated Dataset for Adversarial and Implicit Hate Speech Detection (arXiv:2203.09509, CC0)
4
Models scored in lab cards
14
System cards report it, from 4 labs

Gemma 2B leads with 29.8 among models released by June 2024

Best score per model as labs report them in their own cards. Labs pick their own settings, so these compare less cleanly than independent runs.

The newest model with a score here came out in June 2024, and nobody has reported a newer one. Among the 20 highest-ranked models on the capability index, these have no score yet:

  1. 1 Gemma 2B 29.8
  2. 2 Gemma 2 27B 38.4
  3. 3 Gemma 2 9B 39.3
  4. 4 Gemma 7B 39.6

Source: Labs’ model cards

#ModelScoreSettingDateSource
1 Gemma 2B 29.8 Mar 2024 Lab model card
2 Gemma 2 27B 38.4 Jul 2024 Lab model card
3 Gemma 2 9B 39.3 Jul 2024 Lab model card
4 Gemma 7B 39.6 Mar 2024 Lab model card

Number one over time

Lab claims count from the day the card came out, independent runs from the model’s release.

Google DeepMind
Lab claims Not tested since Jul 2024
Gemma 2B 29.8

Source: Labs’ model cards

Scores over time

All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.

Reported by the lab in its model card
30.0 32.5 35.0 37.5 40.0 2024 30.0 32.5 35.0 37.5 40.0 2024

Source: Labs’ model cards

Labs report it only in system cards

We read the headline results of 522 launch posts from 52 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.

14 system cards report it, from 4 labs

Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.

DateDocumentScoreAs the document writes itSection
Dec 15, 2025 Olmo 3 32B Think technical report 100 Toxigen, Final Think 3.0 column (Table 54) Safety
Dec 15, 2025 Olmo 3.1 32B Think technical report 100 Toxigen, Final Think 3.1 column (Table 54) Safety
Sep 17, 2025 Apertus 70B technical report 70.3 ToxiGen classification accuracy, higher is better (Table 26) Bias
Jul 31, 2024 Gemma 2 9B technical report 39.3 Toxigen, avg tox (lower is better), IT (Table 18) Safety
Jul 31, 2024 Gemma 2 27B technical report 38.4 Toxigen, avg tox (lower is better), IT (Table 18) Safety
Mar 13, 2024 Gemma 7B technical report 39.6 Toxigen (lower is better), IT (Table 8) Safety
Mar 13, 2024 Gemma 2B technical report 29.8 Toxigen (lower is better), IT (Table 8) Safety
Jul 19, 2023 Llama 2-7B technical report 21.3 ToxiGen, % toxic generations (lower is better), pretrained (Table 11). Llama 2-Chat = 0.00 (Table 14) Safety
Jul 19, 2023 Llama 2-70B technical report 24.6 ToxiGen, % toxic generations (lower is better), pretrained (Table 11). Llama 2-Chat = 0.01 (Table 14) Safety
Jul 19, 2023 Llama 2-34B technical report 21.2 ToxiGen, % toxic generations (lower is better), pretrained (Table 11). Llama 2-Chat = 0.02 (Table 14) Safety
Jul 19, 2023 Llama 2-13B technical report 26.1 ToxiGen, % toxic generations (lower is better), pretrained (Table 11). Llama 2-Chat = 0.00 (Table 14) Safety
Jul 18, 2023 Llama 2-7B model card 21.3 Toxigen, % toxic generations (lower is better), pretrained (automatic safety benchmarks table). Llama-2-Chat = 0.00 Safety
Jul 18, 2023 Llama 2-70B model card 24.6 Toxigen, % toxic generations (lower is better), pretrained (automatic safety benchmarks table). Llama-2-Chat = 0.01 Safety
Jul 18, 2023 Llama 2-13B model card 26.1 Toxigen, % toxic generations (lower is better), pretrained (automatic safety benchmarks table). Llama-2-Chat = 0.00 Safety

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