Benchmark Almanac

RTVLM

Only in system cards

Vision language models answer red-teaming image prompts on faithfulness, privacy, safety and fairness. GPT-4V scores responses from 0 to 10.

Released
January 2024
Kind
Refusing harmful requests
Level
Everyday
Scored
Graded by a model
Answers
Open-ended
Tasks
All public
Last in a system card
March 2025
Last model added
March 2025

In the authors’ words

VLMs (Vision-Language Models) extend the capabilities of LLMs (Large Language Models) to accept multimodal inputs. Since it has been verified that LLMs can be induced to generate harmful or inaccurate content through specific test cases (termed as Red Teaming), how VLMs perform in similar scenarios, especially with their combination of textual and visual inputs, remains a question. To explore this problem, we present a novel red teaming dataset RTVLM, which encompasses 10 subtasks (e.g., image misleading, multi-modal jail-breaking, face fairness, etc) under 4 primary aspects (faithfulness, privacy, safety, fairness). Our RTVLM is the first red-teaming dataset to benchmark current VLMs in terms of these 4 different aspects. Detailed analysis shows that 10 prominent open-sourced VLMs struggle with the red teaming in different degrees and have up to 31% performance gap with GPT-4V. Additionally, we simply apply red teaming alignment to LLaVA-v1.5 with Supervised Fine-tuning (SFT) using RTVLM, and this bolsters the models' performance with 10% in RTVLM test set, 13% in MM-Hal, and without noticeable decline in MM-Bench, overpassing other LLaVA-based models with regular alignment data. This reveals that current open-sourced VLMs still lack red teaming alignment. Our code and datasets will be open-source.

Abstract of Red Teaming Visual Language Models (arXiv:2401.12915, CC0)
2
Models scored in lab cards
2
System cards report it, from 1 lab

Phi-4-multimodal leads with 6.39

Best score per model as labs report them in their own cards. Labs pick their own settings, so these compare less cleanly than independent runs.

  1. 1 Phi-4-multimodal 6.39
  2. 2 Phi-3.5-vision-instruct 5.44

Source: Labs’ model cards

#ModelScoreSettingDateSource
1 Phi-4-multimodal 6.39 Mar 2025 Lab model card
2 Phi-3.5-vision-instruct 5.44 Aug 2024 Lab model card

Scores over time

All the scores we have, one dot each, so a model tested at several settings appears more than once.

Reported by the lab in its model card
5.50 5.75 6.00 6.25 2025 5.50 5.75 6.00 6.25 2025

Source: Labs’ model cards

Labs report it only in system cards

We read the headline results of 522 launch posts from 52 labs, and none of them list this benchmark. Some system cards do, below.

2 system cards report it, from 1 lab

Besides launch posts, we read the system cards, model cards and technical reports labs publish with a release. They report far more, including safety and frontier-risk tests.

DateDocumentScoreAs the document writes itSection
Mar 3, 2025 Phi-4-multimodal technical report 6.39 RTVLM (public), 0 to 10, higher is safer (Table 15) Safety
Aug 30, 2024 Phi-3.5-vision-instruct technical report 5.44 RTVLM (public), 0 to 10, higher is better (Table 7) Safety

More in Safety and alignment

All 465 in Safety and alignment
  • FORTRESS In use Paired adversarial and benign national-security misuse prompts. Rubric-graded risk score on adversarial and over-refusal score on benign prompts. Claude Opus 5.5 5.78%
  • StrongREJECT In use Forbidden-prompt jailbreak benchmark with a rubric grader that scores how useful a non-refusal actually is. Inkling 98.6%
  • Gray Swan IPI Arena benchmark In use Indirect prompt-injection attacks from public red-teaming competitions replayed on tool, coding and browser agents. Attack success rate at k attempts. Gemini 4 Carbon 0%
  • DistressBench In use Models reply as a chatbot to 718 simulated users in psychological crisis, in single-turn and multi-turn chats. Three judge models score replies against clinician-written rubrics. Muse Spark 1.2 88.4%
  • Lakera B3 (Backbone Breaker Benchmark) In use Crowdsourced prompt-injection attacks hit backbone LLMs inside agent threat snapshots at three defense levels. The score is attack resistance, 100 minus the board's vulnerability percentage. Claude Opus 4.5 89%
  • IHEval In use Models face conflicts between system, user and tool instructions. Reports a composite score for following the higher-priority instruction. GPT-4o 70%